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(Draft; forthcoming in the Virginia Law Review in 2022) 
 
The President claims exclusive control over diplomacy within our 
constitutional system. Relying on this claim, executive branch lawyers 
repeatedly reject congressional mandates regarding international 
engagement. In their view, Congress cannot specify what the policy of the 
United States is with respect to foreign corruption, cannot bar a 
technology-focused agency from communicating with China, cannot impose 
notice requirements for withdrawal from a treaty with Russia, cannot 
instruct Treasury officials how to vote in the World Bank, and cannot 
require the disclosure of a trade-related report. And these are just a few of 
many examples from recent years. The President’s assertedly exclusive 
powers over diplomacy have become a powerful yet rarely critiqued tool for 
withholding information from Congress and for rebuffing congressional 
supervision over the content and agents of international engagement.  
  
This Article interrogates the constitutional concept of “diplomacy” – a 
word that, for all the emphasis the executive branch now puts upon it, was 
barely an English word at the time of the Framing and was not used during 
the constitution’s drafting and ratification.  Both structural reasoning and 
historical practice suggest that exclusive presidential powers over 
diplomacy should have a narrower ambit than executive branch lawyers 
currently claim. The Article excavates several forgotten limits on these 
powers. One is the distinction between policy and negotiation. The 
executive branch asserts exclusive power over both, but Congress has 
strong counterclaims to a constitutional power to establish policy objectives 
and to control outputs, such as votes in international organization. Another 
limit relates to domestic-facing administrative agencies, which increasingly 
engage in regulatory coordination abroad. Both Congress’s traditional role 
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Glennon, Sandy Mayson, Mark Nevitt, Zach Price, Ryan Scoville, Jeremy Tobacman, 
Ingrid Wuerth, David Zaring, and participants at the Yale-Duke foreign relations law 
roundtable, the International Law in Domestic Court annual conference, and the Penn Law 
faculty workshop. For terrific research support, I thank law librarian Gabriela Femenia and 
research assistants Jamie Nash, David Peters, Benjamin Schwartz, and Bala Thenappan.  
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in supervising agencies and the substance of these agencies’ work suggest 
that their international engagement should not necessarily partake of 
whatever exclusive powers the President holds over diplomacy and instead 
should be more subject to congressional control. The Article closes by 
proposing a distribution of power over international engagement that 
provides more control to Congress and by identifying institutional 
strategies that Congress could deploy to achieve this distribution.  
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A core assumption of the executive branch is that the President 
possesses exclusive constitutional powers with respect to diplomacy. The 
White House and the Department of Justice routinely invoke these asserted 
powers to rebuff congressional interventions in foreign affairs. In 2020, for 
example, the Trump administration declared that Congress cannot specify 
that “[i]t is the policy of the United States” to help foreign allies combat 
corruption; cannot require the executive branch to give it notice prior from 
withdrawing from an important arms-monitoring treaty; and cannot require 
the Secretary of Commerce to provide Congress with a report on its use of 
statutorily delegated authority with respect to tariffs.1 For executive branch 
lawyers, the “President’s exclusive prerogatives in conducting the Nation’s 
diplomatic relations are grounded both in the Constitution’s system for the 
formulation of foreign policy, including the presidential powers set forth in 
Article II of the Constitution, and in the President’s acknowledged 
preeminent role in the realm of foreign relations through the Nation’s 
history.”2 
These sweeping claims fit poorly with our broader constitutional 
framework. As Justice Jackson famously instructed, assertions of exclusive 
presidential power “must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is 
 
1 Letter from Prim F. Escalona, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Eliot 
Engel, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Maxine Waters, 
Chairwoman of the House Committee on Financial Services Regarding H.R. 3843, at 1 
(May 18, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1277331/download; Memorandum 
from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to the Legal 
Advisor to the National Security Council Regarding Congressionally Mandated Notice 
Period for Withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty 2, 10-12 (Sept. 22, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1348136/download [hereinafter OLC Opinion of Sept. 22, 
2020]. Memorandum from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Deputy Counsel to the President, Regarding Publication of a Report to the 
President on the Effect of Automobile and Automobile-Part Imports on National Security, 
OLC (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1236426/download 
[hereinafter OLC Opinion of Jan. 17, 2020]. 
2 Memorandum from Virginia A. Seitz, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, to the General Counsel, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Regarding 
Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology Policy 
in Section 1304(A) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations 
Act, 2011, at 4 (Sept. 19, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/file/18346/download [hereinafter 
OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011]; see also, e.g., Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant 
Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, to Jeb Hensarling, Chairman of the House 
Committee on Financial Services Regarding H.R. 4537, at 1 (Mar. 8, 2018) 
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1041156/download [hereinafter DOJ Letter of Mar. 8, 
2018] (quoting this language).  
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the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”3 Yet the 
exclusive diplomatic powers claimed by the President have gone largely 
unexamined. With the exception of one recent decision focused on the 
power to recognize foreign nations, the Supreme Court has not confronted 
these issues.4 Among scholars as well, the diplomatic powers occupy a 
distant back seat to two other major constitutional powers in the field of 
foreign relations law: the war powers and the treaty powers.5 While 
countless articles explore these two domains, there is relatively little 
scholarship on the diplomatic powers.6 This remains true even as the 
 
3 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
4 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015) (holding that the President has the exclusive 
constitutional power to recognize foreign nations but emphasizing the limited nature of this 
holding); see also infra Part I.A.2 (discussing the implications of Zivotofsky for the 
allocation of the diplomatic powers more generally).  
5 The approach taken in the two major foreign relations law casebooks is illustrative of 
the field’s neglect of the diplomatic powers. Both casebooks have voluminous chapters 
devoted to the treaty powers and the war powers, but neither has even a sub-chapter 
focused on the diplomatic powers. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY, ASHLEY DEEKS & JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xi – xviii (7th ed. 2020) 
(devoting more than 260 pages to treaties, executive agreements, and war powers while not 
mentioning diplomacy in the table of contents); SEAN D. MURPHY, EDWARD T. SWAINE & 
INGRID WUERTH, U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PRACTICE 
EXERCISES xi - xix (5th ed. 2018) (devoting more than 330 pages to treaties, executive 
agreements, and war powers while not mentioning diplomacy in the table of contents). 
Even where the concept of diplomacy is emphasized in general treatises, as in Michael 
Glennon’s work, there is surprisingly little discussion of the constitutional distribution of 
the diplomatic powers, as distinct from war powers and treaty powers. See generally 
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1991). An exception in substantial 
alignment with the executive branch positions described in this Article is H. JEFFERSON 
POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2002) (giving detailed treatment to the President’s 
power over recognition, negotiation, and diplomatic information in addition to considering 
other areas of foreign relations law). 
6 For a few excellent pieces focused on aspects of the diplomatic powers, see generally 
Ryan M. Scoville, Ad Hoc Diplomats, 68 DUKE L.J. 907 (2019) (discussing executive 
branch justifications for the use of non-Senate-confirmed diplomats); Kristina Daugirdas, 
Congress Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 517 (2013) 
(describing the historic responsiveness of the Department of the Treasury to congressional 
directives regarding U.S. participation in the World Bank); Robert Reinstein, Is the 
President’s Recognition Power Exclusive?, 86 TEMPLE L. REV. 1 (2013) (analyzing 
historical practice with respect to executive branch claims of an exclusive power to 
recognize foreign nations); Ryan M. Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, 112 MICH. L. J. 331 
(2012) (assessing the extent to which members of Congress engage in diplomatic activity). 
This Article draws on the insights of these scholars in providing an overarching description 
of the diplomatic powers claimed by the executive branch and showing that most of these 
claims rest on problematic constitutional foundations. One interesting recent article that 
grapples briefly but significantly with the scope of the exclusive diplomatic powers is 
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executive branch has come over time, especially since the late 1980s, to 
invoke these assertedly exclusive powers more widely, stridently, and 
meaningfully. 
The first task of this Article, therefore, is to provide a comprehensive 
account of exclusive diplomatic powers claimed by the President. Simply 
put, the scope of these asserted powers is breathtaking. When executive 
branch lawyers speak of exclusive power over “diplomacy”, they are 
actually sweeping together a bundle of five discrete powers. These are: the 
power to represent the United States abroad; the power to recognize foreign 
nations; the power to determine the content of diplomatic communications; 
the power to select the agents of diplomacy; and the power to control access 
to diplomatic information. Each of these powers has its own constitutional 
pedigree and implicates different institutional values. The first two of these 
powers are well-established but narrow, while the latter three are deeply 
contested and dangerously broad. The exclusive power asserted over 
content, for example, is routinely claimed to encompass total control over 
the “time, scope, and objectives” of negotiations.7 And it reaches not just 
talk but also actions, such as the casting of U.S. votes within international 
organizations. When Congress issues mandates that run counter to these 
claims of exclusive executive power, the executive branch simply needs to 
get a legal opinion from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) in order to have its way.  
Further underlying all claims of the “President’s exclusive power to 
conduct diplomacy”8 is an exceptionally capacious conception of 
“diplomacy.” Whether the subject is war or science, whether the forum is an 
international organization or a bilateral meeting, whether the executive 
branch officials involved are traditional diplomats or insurance regulators – 
all is “diplomacy” to the executive branch and therefore not subject to 
congressional control.9 As OLC has put it in finding that Congress cannot 
 
Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 357 
(2018). Price suggests that Congress should be able to control the conduct of diplomacy 
through the appropriations power in certain resource-dependent contexts. See id. at 449-61. 
7 Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing H.R. 1777 into Law, Dec. 22, 1987, 23 
Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 1547, 1548 (1987) [hereinafter Reagan 1987 Signing 
Statement]; see also, e.g., Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General, Office 
of Legislative Affairs, to Ed Royce, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Regarding H.R. 5819, at 2 (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1035286/download (using similar language). 
8 OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2, at 1. 
9 E.g., DOJ Letter of Mar. 8, 2018, supra note 2, at 2 (asserting that exclusive 
presidential powers over diplomacy rendered unconstitutional almost every section of a 
proposed congressional bill regarding the participation of Department of Treasury officials 
at an international standard-setting organization focused on the regulation of the insurance 
industry).   
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prevent a technology-focused agency from negotiating with Chinese 
counterparts, “We have described the President’s authority over 
international negotiations as extending to any subject that has bearing on the 
national interest.”10   
This panoramic conception of “diplomacy” greatly expands the already 
substantial executive branch powers claimed over diplomatic content, 
agents, and information.  Yet, as this Article shows in its second overall 
contribution, this conception is far from constitutionally foreordained. 
Indeed, the word “diplomacy” itself was barely if at all an English word at 
the time of the Framing and does not appear to have been used at all during 
the many debates surrounding the Constitution’s drafting and ratification.11 
Rather, at that time there was at most a sense that the President had certain 
constitutional prerogatives with respect to the negotiation of treaties, which 
in turn would ultimately require the advice and consent of the Senate.  And 
as the United States came over time to engage in many forms of 
international engagement other than treaties, Congress left most 
management with the executive branch but periodically claimed control 
over aspects of this engagement.  
In particular, I identify four ways in which Congress has in the past 
asserted control over aspects of U.S. international engagement in ways that 
undermine the broad view of “diplomacy” adopted by today’s executive 
branch lawyers. These four ways can be thought of as lost limits on 
exclusive presidential power over diplomacy. These limits are in addition to 
the very important power of Congress to control the implementation (or 
non-implementation) of most U.S. commitments as a matter of domestic 
policy – a power which the executive branch continues to acknowledge as 
belonging to Congress.12  One limit was structural: to view the President as 
having exclusive power over the process of negotiation and the specific 
instructions given to negotiators, but to consider Congress entitled if it 
wished to form foreign policy objectives on the front end and to control acts 
with international legal significance at the back end. A second limit was 
content-based: to define “diplomacy” as encompassing only issues 
involving certain subject matters or above certain thresholds of importance. 
A third limit was institutional:  to exclude domestically focused agencies 
from the ambit of “diplomacy,” such that Congress could exercise its usual 
level of control with respect to their activities abroad and with respect to 
 
10 OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2, at 5 (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
11 See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
12 For a discussion of the power over implementation, see Jean Galbraith, From 
Treaties to International Commitments: the Changing Landscape of Foreign Relations 
Law, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1675, 1707-1710 (2017). 
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how they interfaced with other executive branch actors regarding 
international engagement. A fourth limit developed from the rise of 
international organizations, as Congress initially claimed and exerted 
greater control as a price for supporting U.S. entry and participation in these 
organizations.   
This nuanced and complex history has no place in OLC’s current 
approach to the diplomatic powers. Rather, by selectively invoking early 
sources and reading them out of context, OLC gives the impression that the 
exclusivity of the whole bundle of President’s diplomatic powers is 
longstanding, firmly settled, and plainly applicable to all forms of modern 
foreign relations. The Trump administration took this perspective to its 
logical extreme, repeatedly invoking diplomatic powers in letters objecting 
to draft bills and in several important refusals to obey congressional 
mandates.13 Yet while the Trump administration was unusually truculent, its 
understanding of the diplomatic powers flowed from OLC memoranda 
written during both Democratic and Republican administrations of the prior 
few decades that overread sources, ignored historical practice at odds with 
their positions, and failed to grapple with the profound changes in U.S. 
international engagement from the time of the Framing to the present.   
Given the thin foundations of executive branch claims, 
congressional power over international engagement is ripe for 
reinvigoration. The final goal of this Article is to consider how such 
reinvigoration could be accomplished. This is not an easy avenue of inquiry, 
and it does not lend itself to any very satisfying solution.  Doctrinally, I 
argue in favor of an intermediate approach between the extreme positions 
staked out by the executive branch and an alternative of complete 
congressional supremacy. There are a number of possible ways to 
accomplish this, and I offer some suggestions in the spirit of opening bids.  
Specifically, I suggest using two of the lost limits on “diplomacy” to 
achieve a more tempered balance – limits that draw on historical practice, 
respond to functional changes in U.S. foreign relations since the Framing, 
and emphasize the core structural concept of checks and balances. The first 
 
13 See Jean Galbraith and Benjamin Schwartz, The Trump Administration and 
Executive Power: Evidence from Justice Department Views Letters, LAWFARE BLOG (Feb. 
5, 2019), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-administration-and-executive-power-
evidence-justice-department-views-letters (noting that in the first two years of the Trump 
administration, the Department of Justice sent fifteen letters to Congress raising objections 
to draft legislation as intruding on the president’s diplomatic powers); OLC Opinion of 
Sept. 22, 2020, supra note 1 (invoking the diplomatic powers as a basis for refusing to 
obey a congressional mandate with respect to treaty withdrawal); OLC Opinion of Jan. 17, 
2020, supra note 1 (invoking the diplomatic powers as a basis for refusing to obey a 
congressional reporting requirement). 
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is to acknowledge congressional power to set policy objectives at the front 
end and to mandate certain outcomes at the back end (such as votes cast in 
international organizations) for negotiations whose outcomes will not 
otherwise be brought to the Senate or Congress for approval. The second is 
to treat congressional supremacy over domestic-focused agencies as 
constant with respect to both the domestic and foreign activities of these 
agencies. The use of these limits would rein in the risks of runaway 
presidential power over the content, agents, and information associated with 
U.S. international engagement. 
Especially in the last thirty years, the executive branch has used its 
institutional power to make constitutional fictions about diplomacy into 
practical realities. For Congress to regain constitutional clout, it must bring 
its own institutional power to bear. The groundwork has already been laid 
by Congress’s repeated willingness to enact statutory provisions asserting 
control over diplomacy. The challenge for Congress is in getting the 
executive branch to recognize these provisions as binding as a matter of 
constitutional law. Broadly speaking, Congress can pursue three strategies 
towards this end. First, congressional committees can develop their own 
accounts of the constitutional allocation of the diplomatic powers through 
hearings and reports. Second, Congress can raise the stakes of executive 
branch non-compliance through legislative tactics, such as anti-severability 
provisions that require the executive branch to obey mandates whose 
constitutionality it questions if it wishes to continue to receive related 
appropriations. Third, Congress can seek to involve the courts. This last 
strategy has both the highest risks and rewards and therefore should be 
pursued with particular care.  
I focus in this Article on the distribution of constitutional power 
with respect to diplomacy, broadly defined.  But the account given here has 
contributes more generally to the literature regarding the separation of 
powers. One contribution goes to the existing literature on the role of OLC. 
The findings in this Article support those that view OLC as an enabler of 
exclusive presidential power – and further suggest that the very 
transparency with which OLC expresses its views helps rather than hinders 
this enabling. Another contribution is to complicate some core assumptions 
about the role that historical practice plays in separation-of-powers disputes.  
While historical practice is often thought to be a tool of presidential power, 
it is notable how much historical practice there is – albeit uncited by OLC – 
that supports Congress’s authority to issue mandates with respect to 
international engagement. This suggests that, as a structural matter, 
historical practice may favor findings that Congress and the President have 
concurrent powers rather than findings that either branch has exclusive 
powers.  Finally, this Article serves as a reminder of how much work needs 
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to be done at the intersection of foreign relations law and administrative 
law. Tropes like “diplomacy” conceal complex questions about the 
allocation of powers in a world in which there is no robust divide between 
what is foreign and what is domestic. 
The rest of this Article follows the path described above. Part I 
categorizes the diplomatic powers into five discrete powers – power over 
representation, recognition, content, agents, and information. Although 
Congress disputes the executive branch’s claims to exclusive powers over 
the last three of these powers, the executive branch has institutional 
advantages that enable it to disregard congressional mandates. Part II shows 
that OLC has supplemented the breadth that comes with these five powers 
with depth – by defining “diplomacy” far more broadly than is warranted by 
evidence from the time of the Framing, historical practice, or structural 
constitutional principles. It identifies four lost limits on the constitutional 
concept of “diplomacy,” of which one is structural, one is based in subject 
matter, one is institutional, and one is tied to the special status of 
international organizations. Part III proposes a doctrinal allocation that 
provides more control to Congress and identifies institutional strategies that 
Congress could deploy to achieve this distribution. It also notes several 
broader implications that this Article holds for the study of the separation of 
powers.   
This Article focuses on the constitutional conflict between Congress 
and the Presidency with respect to control over diplomacy. With this focus 
come inevitable limitations, two of which deserve specific mention. First, 
some of the power struggles described here – particularly regarding control 
over agents and information – are entwined with broader constitutional 
questions about the extent to which Congress can control the structure of 
the executive branch and demand information from it. I do not address these 
questions, but rather focus on the extent to which power struggles relating 
to control over international engagement do or should differ from the 
broader baseline, whatever it is. The second limitation is that I focus on 
legal claims rather than on policy outcomes. It is possible and indeed often 
the case that the executive branch will object on principle to a legislative 
provision related to diplomacy even where it is either in full agreement with 
the policy set forth in this provision – or willing to adhere to this policy in 
practice to placate members of Congress. But while these factors reduce the 
practical effect of constitutional disagreements, they are not full substitutes 
for the constitutional allocation of control. One of the many grim lessons 
left over from the Trump administration is that law rather than norms can be 
the only boundary between action and constraint.  
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I. THE PRESIDENT’S CLAIMS TO EXCLUSIVE DIPLOMATIC POWERS 
 
The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice 
considers it “well settled that the Constitution vests the President with the 
exclusive authority to conduct the Nation’s diplomatic relations with other 
States.”14 A key word here is “exclusive.” With respect to most matters of 
international negotiation, no one doubts that, from the beginning, the 
President has had independent power in the face of congressional silence.15 
But OLC’s claims go far further in invoking exclusive authority, 
empowering presidents to act as they see fit even if statutes passed by 
Congress direct otherwise. 
The exclusive executive authority over diplomacy claimed by OLC is 
both sweeping and contested. As this Part shows, this authority is actually a 
bundle of five discrete powers, each individually significant and 
collectively astounding in their scope. And there are good reasons to 
question OLC’s constitutional reasoning with respect to three of these 
powers. Indeed, our constitutional history is replete with instances where 
Congress has legislated regarding these powers in ways that OLC would 
now call unconstitutional.  
Notwithstanding their contested nature, OLC’s legal views give the 
President a powerful upper hand. For if executive branch officials do not 
want to obey a congressional mandate relating to diplomacy, they can get a 
legal opinion from OLC excusing them from doing so. Executive branch 
actors have invoked this work-around in a range of contexts and, most 
recently, the Trump administration used it for several high-stakes issues.  
 
A.  The Bundle of Diplomatic Powers 
 
The struggle for control over diplomacy between the executive branch 
and Congress is multifaceted. In what follows, I unbundle the diplomatic 
 
14 Bill to Relocate United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, 19 Op. O.L.C. 
123, 124 (1995), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1995/05/31/op-
olc-v019-p0123_0.pdf (emphasis added). 
15 There are a few arguable exceptions. One is the President’s power to use special 
envoys who have not been approved by the Senate as agents in negotiations. See Scoville, 
Ad Hoc Diplomats, supra note 6, at 917-21. Another – also related to a power partly 
entrusted to the Senate – is the President’s power to instruct U.S. diplomats engaged in 
treaty negotiations without pre-clearing these instructions with the Senate. Jean Galbraith, 
Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 256-60 (2012) (noting how this 
power was initially contested during the Washington administration). The Supreme Court 
has observed that the President has a “vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our 
foreign relations, including “the lead role … in foreign policy” and “a degree of 
independent authority to act.” Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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powers into five categories: the power to represent the United States 
abroad; the power to recognize foreign nations; the power to decide the 
content of diplomatic communications; the power to select and control the 
agents of diplomacy; and the power to control access to diplomatic 
information. These five categories differ not only in their functions, but also 
in the institutional values which they advance or constrain.  
For each category, I first describe its contours and then discuss the 
extent to which it is currently the subject of contestation between the 
executive branch and Congress. As will be seen, OLC claims that the 
President has exclusive control over all these powers (and defines them 
broadly), often relying on shoddy reasoning to exaggerate the arguments in 
its favor and overlook historical practice to the contrary. By contrast, 
Congress continues to legislate in ways that assert authority over aspects of 
United States international engagement, including with respect to content, 
agents, and information. 
 
1. Power over Representation 
 
The most intuitive of the diplomatic powers – and the one with the 
strongest justification for presidential exclusivity – is the power to represent 
the United States abroad. While a member of the House of Representatives 
in 1800, John Marshall described the President as “the sole organ of the 
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign 
nations,” explaining that “any act to be performed by the force of the nation 
is to be performed through him.”16 By the mid-twentieth century, the 
renowned scholar Edward Corwin would remark that “there is no more 
securely established principle of constitutional practice than the exclusive 
right of the President to be the nation’s intermediary in its dealing with 
other nations.”17 
The President’s power over representation goes to the process by which 
the United States engages abroad. To channel Corwin once again, this 
power to serve as the “mouthpiece” of the United States is analytically 
distinct from the “power of decision” over what is to be said.18 Indeed, the 
President’s power to represent the United States may have come originally 
 
16 10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. Marshall) (arguing that the 
President therefore had the constitutional authority to carry out an extradition in keeping 
with the terms of a pre-existing treaty).  As one scholar has observed, “[e]arly on, letters 
addressed to Congress from foreign nations were left unopened and sent to the president,” 
given the President’s role as the organ of communications.  SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE 
PRAKASH, THE LIVING PRESIDENCY: AN ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS EVER-
EXPANDING POWER 189 (2020). 
17 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 184 (4th ed. 1957). 
18 Id. at 178. 
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from international rather than constitutional law. The written Constitution 
does not specifically assign the power to represent the United States abroad 
to either of the political branches. Reading it, one might think that the right 
to represent the United States abroad should be shared between Congress 
and the President. Congress is entitled to “declare war,” “regulate 
commerce with foreign nations,” and legislate as is “necessary and proper” 
to effectuate all vested federal powers, while the President makes treaties 
and appoints ambassadors “with the advice and consent of the Senate,” 
“receive[s] Ambassadors,” and faithfully executes the laws.19 Yet 
international law at the time of the Framing and since has put a heavy 
thumb on the President’s side of the scale by channeling diplomatic 
communications through public ministers and giving special privileges to 
heads of state.20 
The President’s power over representation gives the President the 
exclusive right to communicate diplomatically on behalf of the United 
States. It is not an exclusive right to control all communication that takes 
place between governmental officials within the United States and foreign 
counterparts. U.S. history is replete with communication between foreign 
governmental actors and independent agencies, members of Congress, 
governors, and even local leaders.21 While executive branch actors have 
occasionally described such communications as unconstitutional,22 practical 
 
19 See U.S. CONST. arts. I & 2. 
20 See, e.g., EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. IV, §§ 56 & 59 (providing 
that the “only way for nations and sovereigns to communicate and adjust their interest is … 
by means of public ministers” and further observing that those who have “the right … of 
treating with foreign powers … incontestably have also that of sending and receiving 
public ministers”); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 7, opened for signature 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (providing that “Heads 
of State, Heads of Government, and Ministers for Foreign Affairs” are “considered as 
representing their State” without needing to produce credentials to that effect). 
21 See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown & David Zaring, The Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Reserve, 44 J. CORP. L. 665 (2018) (describing how the Federal Reserve Board engages 
abroad); Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, supra note 6 (documenting extensive interactions 
with foreign governmental officials by members of Congress over time); Julian Ku, 
Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2391-96 (2006) (documenting 
examples of interactions between governors and other state executives with foreign 
governmental officials). 
22 By way of example, when Senator Tom Cotton and numerous Republican 
colleagues sent an open letter to the leaders of Iran that sought to undercut the Obama 
administration’s negotiations with Iran regarding nuclear weapons, Secretary of State John 
Kerry referred to this letter as “unconstitutional.” Reena Flores, John Kerry Slams 
‘Unconstitutional’ GOP Letter to Iran, CBSNEWS.COM (Mar. 15, 2015), at 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-kerry-will-not-apologize-for-unconstitutional-gop-
letter/. For a discussion of this issue and an argument that there should be a “converse 
Youngstown framework” for evaluating the constitutionality of such actions, see Kristen E. 
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reality pushes firmly in the other direction. These other governmental actors 
can say what they want with great freedom, and they have considerable 
power to make commitments for whatever governmental units are within 
their control.23 But the power to formally speak for the United States – what 
Ryan Scoville calls sovereign diplomacy24 – lies with the President.  
 
2. Power over Recognition 
 
A second diplomatic power is the recognition power. Recognition refers 
to formal acknowledgment for purposes of international law of another’s 
international legal status, including “the recognition of states, the 
recognition of governments, and the recognition of insurgency or 
belligerency.”25 
The power over recognition is the power to confer status. Like the 
power of representation, it serves as a gatekeeper to the rest of diplomacy 
on the part of the United States. But where the power of representation is 
about who speaks for the United States, the power of recognition is about 
whom the United States views as a legitimate counterpart. Closely 
associated with this power is the right to determine what foreign powers – 
or individual representatives of these foreign powers – the United States 
will engage with diplomatically.26 
 
Eichensehr, Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 
609, 629-39, 647-49 (2018). 
23 This is true notwithstanding the Logan Act, 1 Stat. 613 (1799), which authorizes the 
criminal prosecution of U.S. citizens who communicate with foreign governmental agents 
in ways aimed at affecting U.S. foreign relations. Although the Logan Act exists on the 
books, to date it has seen basically no use in practice. Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, 
supra note 6, at 352-53 (noting no historic uses against members of Congress and 
identifying unresolved questions regarding the reach of the Logan Act). 
24 Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, supra note 6, at 334; see also id. at 364 (noting the 
robust historical support for “the president as holding exclusive power to engage in 
sovereign diplomacy”).  
25 2 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1 (1963) (also 
noting its use with respect to acquisition of territory).  
26 See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, Memorandum Regarding Section 609 of the FY 1996 
Omnibus Appropriations Act, 20 O.L.C. 189, 194 (May 15, 1996) [hereinafter OLC 
Opinion of May 15, 1996] (asserting that a congressional appropriations statute seeking to 
limit the U.S. diplomatic footprint in Vietnam unless Vietnam met certain conditions was 
unconstitutional because the “Executive’s recognition power necessarily subsumes within 
itself the power … to define the nature and extent of diplomatic communications with an 
as-yet unrecognized government”). A further issue is the extent to which an exclusive 
recognition power would imply an exclusive power to determine certain immunities. 
Compare Lewis S. Yelin, Head of State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking, 44 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 911, 951-61 (2011) (arguing that such an exclusive executive power 
flows from what the author considers settled exclusive presidential power over diplomacy, 
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The executive branch has long considered the President to have 
exclusive power over recognition. There are reasons to debate this view, but 
it is one on which Congress has offered relatively little resistance over the 
course of constitutional history.27 And in 2015 the Supreme Court validated 
the executive branch’s position, holding that the recognition power was 
indeed exclusive to the President. Zivotofsky v. Kerry considered whether 
Congress could force the State Department to permit U.S. citizens born in 
Jerusalem to list “Israel” as their country of birth on their passports.28 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the five-justice majority observed that the 
clause in Article II providing that the President may receive ambassadors 
gave rise to “a logical and proper inference … [that this clause] would be 
understood to acknowledge his power to recognize foreign nations.”29 In 
finding the recognition power exclusive to the President, the Court 
emphasized that “[t]he weight of historical evidence indicates Congress has 
accepted that the power to recognize foreign states and governments and 
their territorial bounds is exclusive to the Presidency.”30 By contrast, the 
three dissenting justices expressed skepticism that the President’s 
recognition power was exclusive and reasoned that the case did not 
implicate the recognition power in any event.31  
In finding that the President had exclusive control over recognition, the 
Court took care to signal the narrowness of its holding. It indicated that the 
President had some further exclusive diplomatic prerogatives, but it made 
no broad pronouncements with respect to control over agents, content, or 
information.32 To the contrary, the Court included the following caution: 
 
including the recognition power) with Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity 
Determination in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 15 VA. J. INT’L L. 
915, 918-21 (2011) (arguing against an exclusive executive power to make certain 
immunity decisions). 
27 For a careful account of historical practice as it relates to the recognition power, see 
generally Reinstein, supra note 6. 
28 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 7-9 (2015).  
29 Id. at 12. A sixth justice – Justice Thomas – concurred in part in the judgment of 
majority. Justice Thomas did not rely on claims particular to the recognition power, 
however, but rather argued that the President had a more general exclusive foreign affairs 
power.  
30 Id. at 28.  
31 Id. at 64 (Roberts., C.J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the President has at least a 
concurrent power over recognition, but stating “I am not convinced” that this power is 
exclusive); Id. at 71 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[n]either text nor history nor precedent yields 
a clear answer to these questions [of exclusivity]”).  
32 See 576 U.S. at 21 (observing that the “President does have a unique role in 
communicating with foreign governments, as then-Congressman John Marshall 
acknowledged”). The Court also noted in passing that the “President has the sole power to 
negotiate treaties” and observed that “Congress may not send an ambassador without his 
involvement.” Id. at 13. The Court did not suggest that a sole power to negotiate treaties – 
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The Secretary [of State] now urges the Court to define 
the executive power over foreign relations in even broader 
terms. He contends that under the Court’s precedent the 
President has ‘exclusive authority to conduct diplomatic 
relations,’ along with ‘the bulk of foreign-affairs powers.” 
…. The Court declines to acknowledge that unbounded 
power. A formulation broader than the rule that the President 
alone determines what nations to formally recognize as 
legitimate … presents different issues and is unnecessary to 
the resolution of this case.  
…  
In a world that is ever more compressed and 
interdependent, it is essential the congressional role in 
foreign affairs be understood and respected. For it is 
Congress that makes laws, and in countless ways its laws 
will and should shape the Nation’s course. … It is not for the 
President alone to determine the whole content of the 
Nation’s foreign policy.33 
 
3. Power over Content 
 
A third power is the authority to control the content of diplomacy. To 
what extent can Congress specify U.S. foreign policy objectives and 
mandate that that the executive branch pursue (or not pursue) certain 
negotiating objectives? Can Congress establish waiting periods or other 
rules related to the timing of diplomacy? Can Congress direct how the 
United States votes in international organizations? 
Power over the content of diplomatic communications goes to the 
substance of U.S. foreign policy. Unlike the power over representation, 
which is about the process of communication, the power over content 
directly implicates the principle of democratic control. 
At the time of the Framing, the issue of control over content arose 
mostly in relation to treaties – which require the advice and consent of two-
 
which would later be put to the Senate for advice and consent – amounted to a sole power 
over the content of all diplomacy, let alone a sweeping understanding of “diplomacy”.  
33 Id. at 21; see also id. at 67 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s 
decision to “allow[] the President to defy an Act of Congress in the field of foreign affairs” 
as a “perilous step”). The Court also signaled disapproval of expansive dicta favoring 
exclusive presidential foreign affairs powers from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). Id. at 20-21. For discussion of the ambivalence of 
Zivotofsky with respect to broader exclusive executive power over diplomacy, see Harlan 
Grant Cohen, Zivotofsky II’s Two Visions for Foreign Relations Law, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 
10, 14-15 (2015). 
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thirds of the Senate prior to ratification. Practice in the Washington 
Administration established that the President could develop negotiating 
instructions against a backdrop of silence from the Senate but did not 
address whether the President could give instructions that contradicted a 
mandate from the Senate.34 
In 1816, the newly formed Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted 
that the “President is the constitutional representative of the United States 
with regard to foreign nations” and expressed its view that the President 
“must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon 
what subjects negotiations may be urged with the greatest prospect of 
success.”35 In cautioning the Senate to leave negotiations to the President, 
however, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee neither said that the 
Senate was constitutionally obligated to do so nor directly opined on 
whether the President had the constitutional power to disregard direction 
from the Senate. The Committee emphasized that the Senate would later 
have the right to approve or disapprove the ultimate product of negotiations, 
observing that “the more separate and distinct in practice the negotiating 
and treaty-ratifying powers are kept, the more safe the national interest.”36 
Questions of control over diplomatic content arose in other settings 
during the nineteenth century. In one incident in the 1820s, President John 
Quincy Adams sought an appropriation for a U.S. diplomat to attend an 
international conference, and Congress debated whether to include 
negotiation instructions in the appropriation. In a speech on the floor of the 
House, Daniel Webster resisted this inclusion because he considered that 
“the giving of instructions to Ministers abroad” was “an exercise of 
Executive power.”37 He felt that Congress should not instruct specific 
diplomats, but he also made explicit his view that Congress could exert 
control over the overall content of U.S. foreign policy. Webster had “[n]o 
doubt” that the executive branch could maintain a negotiating position with 
respect to Cuba “only so long as it receives the approbation and support of 
Congress,” adding that “[i]f Congress be of the opinion that [the current] 
course of policy is wrong, then he agreed it was the power, and he thought, 
indeed, the duty of Congress to interfere and express its dissent.”38 
Today, the executive branch claims total constitutional control over the 
 
34 See Galbraith, supra note 15, at 256-60 (noting how this power was initially 
contested during the Washington administration).   
35 S. Foreign Relations Comm., 56th Cong., Rep. of Feb. 15, 1816, reprinted in 6 
Compilation of Reports of Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 1789-1901, at 21 
(1901) [hereinafter 1816 SFRC Report].  
36 Id. at 22. 
37 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress from 1789 to 1856, at 94 (April 1826) 
(statement of Rep. Webster). 
38 Id. 
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content of diplomacy. A commonly used phrase by OLC and in some 
presidential signing statements is that the President has “exclusive 
constitutional authority to determine the time, scope, and objectives of 
international negotiations.”39 Notably, this sweeping phrase dates to the 
1980s – about two hundred years after the Framing – and was brought into 
OLC parlance by William Barr in 1990.40 In the view of the executive 
branch, Congress can never mandate that the executive branch initiate 
negotiations, pursue specified negotiating objectives, adhere to a waiting 
period prior to finalizing an agreement, absent itself from certain 
negotiations, or veto a Security Council resolution. Nor can Congress 
control U.S. diplomacy at a high level of generality by establishing the 
strategic goals, while leaving tactical decisions to the executive branch. 
Congress cannot even use the phrase “it is the policy of the United States” 
with respect to matters of foreign policy.41  
 
39 E.g., President Statement on Signing the Countering America’s Adversaries 
Through Sanctions Act, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 201700559 (Aug. 2, 2017).  
40 The first approximate use of this phrase that I have found came in a signing 
statement by President Ronald Reagan in 1987. Reagan 1987 Signing Statement, supra 
note 7 (“I construe these [statutory] provisions as being subject to my exclusive authority to 
determine the time, scope, and objectives of any negotiations”). OLC first incorporated this 
phrase into a legal memorandum several years later and has used it frequently since. 
William Barr, Issues Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14 O.L.C. 37, 41 
(Feb. 16, 1990) [hereinafter OLC Opinion of Feb. 16, 1990] (describing President Reagan’s 
signing statement in as parenthetical as “invoking the President’s exclusive authority to 
determine the time, scope, and objectives’ on any international negotiations”); 
Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Acting Legal Adviser, Department of States, Regarding Constitutionality of 
Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, at 8 (June 1, 2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/18496/download [hereinafter OLC Opinion of June 1, 2009] 
(citing prior uses). For a critique of this last memo, see Rachel Sussman, Note, The Power 
of Parlay: Control of the Diplomacy Power between Congress and the Eecutive, 8 GEO. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 537, 554-57 (2010).  
41 For example, even as the Trump administration emphasized the need to prevent Iran 
from developing ballistic missiles that could launch nuclear weapons, it objected to 
language along these lines from Congress as intruding on the President’s exclusive 
diplomatic powers. Compare White House Press Release, Remarks by President Trump on 
Iran Strategy (Oct. 13, 2017), available at 
https://www.npr.org/2017/10/13/557622096/transcript-trump-s-remarks-on-iran-nuclear-
deal (noting that it is “so totally important” “to prevent Iran from developing … an 
intercontinental ballistic missile” and expressing support for a congressional bill on this 
issue), with Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General, to Rep. Ed Royce, 
Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, at 1 (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1019941/download (objecting on constitutional 
grounds to a provision stating that it “is the policy of the United States to prevent Iran from 
undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering 
nuclear weapons” since this provision “is apparently intended to require the Executive 
Branch to initiate contact with foreign partners relating to specific topics and to advance 
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Instead, under the executive branch’s view, Congress has no direct 
power over diplomacy and can exert only persuasion or indirect power.  As 
to persuasion, Congress can promise carrots to the executive branch if it 
adheres to congressional preferences – such as by promising to give up-or-
down votes to trade agreements whose negotiations track to congressionally 
determined aims.42 As to indirect power, Congress can influence the content 
of diplomacy through legislation that on its face is unrelated to 
communication between nations.  For example, Congress can mandate 
sanctions on a particular country, and these sanctions will undoubtedly cast 
a shadow on any negotiating positions taken by the executive branch in 
relation to that country. Congressional inaction can similarly have indirect 
effects on negotiations.  In the absence of domestic cap-and-trade 
legislation, for example, the executive branch knows that it should not 
commit the United States internationally to a cap-and-trade program unless 
this commitment is made contingent on the later obtainment of 
implementing legislation.  These are important constraints in practice, but 
they do not serve as direct limits on how the executive branch interacts with 
foreign counterparts or within international organizations.  
In support of its views, OLC largely cites back to its own prior 
positions. Where it cites to historical precedents – like the 1816 SFRC 
report and the Daniel Webster remarks – it does so in questionable ways. As 
to the 1816 SFRC report, OLC treats it as supporting the broader claim that 
Congress may not “purport[] to impose statutory restrictions” on “the 
President’s authority to determine whether, how, when, and through whom 
to engage in foreign diplomacy.”43 OLC does not recognize that central to 
the 1816 report (which involved the Senate rather than Congress) was the 
recognition that the Senate would have a chance to review the end product 
 
specified objectives”). The Department of Justice took a similar position during the Obama 
administration. See Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, to Rep. Ileana 
Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, at 1-2 (Nov. 1, 
2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ola/legacy/2011/11/08/110111-ltr-re-hr-
1905-iran-threat-reduction-act-2011.pdf (objecting to similar language in a proposed bill on 
the ground that declaring the “policy of the United States” would “purport[] to state a 
general national policy that would encompass positions taken by the United States in 
international discussions and negotiations”).  It is unclear whether, as a matter of 
interpretation, language specifying “the policy of the United States” creates legal 
obligations – is it more a substantive mandate or more like a preamble? – but it is clear that 
the executive branch views this language as constitutionally objectionable in statutes 
addressing issues of foreign affairs. 
42 For a recent example, see the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-26, 129 Stat. 320 (2015), which President Obama 
signed into law without making a signing statement.  
43 OLC Opinion of June 1, 2009, supra note 39, at 7; see also OLC Opinion of Feb. 16, 
1990, supra note 39, at 41 (quoting the SFRC Report). 
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of diplomacy – the treaty – through its advice and consent process. This 
premise does not hold for most types of international engagement today, as 
very few negotiations lead to Article II treaties or even to agreements that 
will be subsequently put to Congress for approval.44 Similarly, with the 
Webster remarks, OLC mentions these only as sources of support for claims 
of exclusive presidential powers over diplomacy and never discusses the 
way in which they undermine these claims with respect to the content of 
diplomacy.45 
Despite claims to exclusive control over the content of diplomacy made 
by the executive branch, Congress has passed many, many statutes asserting 
control over the content of U.S. international engagement. Congress has 
used the phrase “the policy of the United States” in legislation relating to 
diplomatic objectives since long before OLC started objecting to this phrase 
– indeed since long before OLC even existed as an institution.46 And the 
pages of the United States Statutes at Large have many examples of more 
granular commands as well. Congress sometimes mandates specifically that 
“the President shall negotiate” on a particular issue, as in “[t]he President 
shall negotiate suitable arrangements with the Republic of Panama whereby 
each nation shall agree to take all measures within its legal authority to 
assure that members of [a] Board of the Commission comply with [a 
specified] code of conduct.”47 Other statutory provisions use slightly 
 
44 See Oona A. Hathaway, Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Failed 
Transparency Regime for Executive Agreements: An Empirical and Normative Analysis, 
134 HARV. L. REV. 629, 632-33 (2020) (noting that most international agreements made by 
the United States today are done not as treaties, but rather as executive agreements that do 
not receive the subsequent consent of Congress). 
45 Walter Dellinger, Presidential Certification Regarding the Provision of Documents 
to the House of Representatives under the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995, 20 O.L.C. 
253, 273 n. 66 (June 28, 1996) [hereinafter OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996]; OLC Opinion 
of May 15, 1996, supra note 26, at 197 & n. 18. 
46 For a few early examples, see 21 Stat. 308 (1880) (“Whereas it is the policy of the 
United States to permit its own citizens and the citizens of France, Spain, Italy, and Austria 
to freely engage” in certain trade); Pub. L. 81-774 § 2, 64 Stat. 798 (1950) (“It is the policy 
of the United Sates to oppose acts of aggression and to promote peace by insuring … the 
peaceful settlement of disputes among nations”). For some later examples, see Pub. L. 89-
808, 80 Stat. 1526 (1966) (“The Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United 
States to expand international trade …”); Pub. L. 95-242 § 2, 92 Stat. 120 (1978) (“it is the 
policy of the United States to … actively pursue through international initiatives, 
mechanisms for [nuclear] fuel supply assurances …”). The executive branch has not 
always honored congressional pronouncements about U.S. foreign policy. See Eli N. 
Nobleman, Financial Aspects of Congressional Participation in Foreign Relations, 289 
ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145, 155 (1953) (describing an instance in which 
the executive branch disregarded a policy pronouncement accompanied by a request to host 
a conference). 
47 Pub. L. 96-70, 93 Stat. 460 (Sept. 27, 1979); see also Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 898 
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different phrasing, such as a 1996 statute stating that “The President shall 
seek to develop, in coordination with … other countries … a 
comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to … Burma.”48 
Neither these examples nor the accompanying ones mentioned below in 
footnotes triggered executive branch objections in the form of signing 
statements. While Congress may be content to leave most decisions about 
the content of diplomacy to the executive branch, this legislation 
demonstrates a congressional view that Congress is entitled to pass 
legislative mandates about the content of international engagement if it so 
chooses. 
Voting in international organizations is a special form of diplomatic 
engagement – not just talk, but also an act of international legal 
significance. The executive branch now claims that it has exclusive control 
over how the United States casts its votes.49 Yet Congress has long asserted 
 
(1972) (“[T]he President shall negotiate multilateral treaties, conventions, resolutions, or 
other agreements, and formulate, present, or support proposals at the United Nations and 
other appropriate international forums” seeking certain uniform standards and controls over 
pollution). I focus here on statutory provisions that use “shall” or otherwise sound like 
mandates, as these are the ones in which Congress’s assertion of power is most forceful. 
Congress commonly weighs in using more permissive language (e.g., “The President 
should” or “The President is requested”) and also often uses language that connotates a 
delegation of authority but not a directive to act (e.g., “The President is authorized”). For 
an example of both permissive and delegating language, see Pub. L. 62-4, 37 Stat. 12 (July 
26, 1911) (“the President … is authorized and requested to negotiate trade agreements with 
the Dominion of Canada …”). 
48 Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-168 (1996). In a decision about foreign affairs 
federalism, the Supreme Court noted this statutory provision in passing without expressing 
any concerns about its legality. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 365, 381 
(2000) (noting that “Congress’s express command to the President to take the initiative for 
the United States among the international community invested him with the maximum 
authority of the National Government, cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635, 
in harmony with the President’s own constitutional powers”); see also Lori Fisler 
Damrosch, Treaties and International Regulation, 98 ASIL Proc. 349, 351 (2004) (noting 
that the Supreme Court in Crosby “cast no doubt whatsoever on [the provision’s] 
constitutionality as between Congress and the president”). For a few other variants, see 
Pub. L. 98-164, 97 Stat. 1022 (1984) (“The President shall use every available means at his 
disposal to ensure that the 1985 Conference to commemorate the conclusion of the United 
Nations Decade for Women is not dominated by political issues extraneous to the goals of 
the 1985 Women’s Conference”); Pub. L. 99-399, 100 Stat. 874 (1986) (“The Congress 
hereby directs the President … to seek universal adherence to the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material … [and] to seek agreement in the United Nations 
Security Council” respecting nuclear terrorism). For some other directives, largely aimed at 
members of the executive branch other than the President, see Ryan Scoville, Compelled 
Diplomacy in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 9 NYU J. L & LIB. 1, 9-10 (2014). 
49 E.g., DOJ Letter of Mar. 8, 2018, supra note 2, at 1-2, 2-3; Daugirdas, supra note 6, 
at 520 (noting that “Every president since George H.W. Bush has issued signing statements 
objecting that these legislated instructions [including on how U.S. representatives in 
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control with respect to votes, including on many occasions without 
objections from the executive branch.50 As one significant example, 
Congress specified in a 1947 statute that the United States would “waive the 
exercise of any veto” in the U.N. Security Council on the subject of aid to 
Greece or Turkey.51 As President Truman’s Secretary of State explained in 
his memoirs, this provision was deemed “a cheap price for [a leading 
Senator’s] patronage and warmly welcomed by … our representative at the 
United Nations.”52 There is no implication that executive branch actors 
doubted the constitutionality of this provision; rather, the implication is one 
of acquiescence.53 Yet this statutory precedent finds no mention in OLC 
memoranda.  
 
4. Power over Agents 
 
A fourth diplomatic power relates to the agents of diplomacy. The 
Constitution’s Appointments Clause provides that the President “shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors [and] other public Ministers and Consuls.”54 This 
language suggests that the selection of diplomats requires joint acceptance 
by the President and the Senate. This language does not explicitly address 
broader organizational questions, like who has the authority to create offices 
 
international financial institutions should vote] impinge on the president’s exclusive 
constitutional authority to engage in international negotiations”).  
50 Daugirdas recounts this history with respect to the World Bank and the IMF. 
Daugirdas, supra note 6, at 526-33 (listing many examples). In the early days of 
international organizations, Congress sometimes sought to assert even more control. See 
Pub. L. 64-131, 64 39 Stat. 260 (July 1, 1916) (“The duly appointed representative of the 
United States on the Permanent Commission of the International Geodetic Associate is 
hereby granted authority to vote with the representatives on the permanent commission 
from other nations on all matters coming before the association … subject to the approval 
of Congress”). 
51 Pub. L. 80-75, 61 Stat. 103, 104 (1947). 
52 DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE 
DEPARTMENT 223-224 (1969). 
53 See id. There is also at least a touch of historical practice to support Congress’s 
ability to exercise control over whether the United States signs an international agreement. 
In appropriating money in 1924 for a conference aimed at renegotiating the Opium 
Convention, Congress provided that “the representative of the United States shall sign no 
agreement which does not fulfill [certain] conditions necessary of the suppression of the 
habit-forming narcotic drug traffic.” 43 Stat. 120 (1924). The head of the U.S. negotiating 
team – who happened to be the same member of Congress who had proposed this 
limitation – cited this requirement in withdrawing the United States from the conference. 
Nobleman, supra note 46, at 156 (noting, however, that “no attention appears to have been 
paid to [these] instructions in a subsequent conference seven years later”).  
54 U.S. CONST. art II § 2.  
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and whether Congress can assign specific tasks to specific offices.  
Like the power over representation, the power over the agents of 
diplomacy is about process. But unlike the power over representation, the 
power over agents is focused inward rather than outward. It is not about 
which branch communicates with the rest of the world on behalf of the 
United States, but rather about how the actors within the executive branch 
are chosen, empowered, and supervised. Executive branch lawyers now 
claim that presidents can exercise exclusive control over the agents of 
diplomacy. These claims offer the President ways to bypass both the Senate 
advice and consent process for appointees and congressional mandates 
regarding how the executive branch conducts diplomacy. 
While many executive branch actors who participate in diplomacy are 
Senate-approved, Presidents consider themselves entitled to conduct 
diplomacy through agents who have not received Senate approval. Ryan 
Scoville’s work aptly describes how Presidents came to claim the right to 
use special envoys for diplomacy, in large part by aggressively overreading 
early precedents.55 This proclaimed right means that, with respect to 
diplomacy, the President can circumvent Senate oversight via the 
Appointments Clause whenever the President wishes to do so. In the Trump 
administration, for example, Jared Kushner never received a Senate-
confirmed appointment but had a diplomatic portfolio that included the 
Middle East peace process.56 
In addition to the power to use special envoys, Presidents claim an 
exclusive right to decide who participates in negotiations. Early in 
constitutional history, there was debate over whether Congress could 
establish diplomatic offices, but by the early twentieth century “Congress 
ha[d] gained power at the expense of the executive … in the matter of 
appointments.”57 Congress has frequently established particular offices and 
assigned portfolios to these offices, as with the requirement that the 
President “shall appoint” an ambassador to the United Nations who “shall 
represent the United States in the Security Council of the United Nations.”58 
 
55 Scoville, Ad Hoc Diplomats, supra note 6, at 917-21 (describing these claims of 
authority, though arguing they are inconsistent with the Constitution’s plain meaning and 
that significant early practice cuts against this position). 
56 Id. at 910. 
57 Henry M. Wriston, American Participation in International Conferences, 20 AJIL 
33, 33 (1926) (discussing various nineteenth century statutes and how initial resistance by 
the executive branch on constitutional and international legal grounds to these statutes 
gradually dwindled).  For an account of the earlier practice in which the Washington 
administration had fended off legislative mandates regarding diplomatic grades, see 
POWELL, supra note 6, at 40-47. 
58 United Nations Participation Act of 1945, Pub. L. 79-264, 59 Stat. 619 (Dec. 20, 
1945). For a discussion of this practice and more generally of constitutional issues related 
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Especially since the 1990s, however, the executive branch has resisted 
congressional efforts to limit who can occupy these offices or to insist that 
certain negotiations go through certain offices. In 1995, for example, OLC 
declared unconstitutional a congressional requirement that the U.S. Trade 
Representative could not have previously advised a foreign government in 
trade negotiations.59 And in 2011, OLC stated that Congress could not bar 
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy from 
collaborating with China because this bar would conflict with the 
President’s “exclusive constitutional authority to choose the agents who will 
engage” in diplomatic communications.60 
Notwithstanding these executive branch claims, past congressional 
legislation reveals ample instances in which Congress has exercised control 
in ways that the executive branch now resists. In addition to structuring the 
bureaucracies of diplomacy, Congress has passed many statutes specifying 
that certain executive branch actors shall undertake negotiations and at 
times also specifying that these actors should consult with particular other 
persons in the process.61 This practice has antecedents that go back to 1792, 
 
to the establishment of diplomatic offices, see Ryan Scoville, Unqualified Ambassadors, 69 
DUKE L. J. 71, 149-166 (2019). 
59 Memorandum from Christopher Schroeder, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, to Counsel to the President, Regarding Constitutionality of Statute 
Governing Appointment of United States Trade Representative, OLC (July 1, 1996), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1996/07/31/op-olc-v020-
p0279_0.pdf (determining that “the restriction is particularly egregious because the office 
in question involves representation of the United States to foreign governments – an area 
constitutionally committed to the President”). 
60 OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2, at 5; see also, e.g., Letter from 
Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, to Ed Royce, 
Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Regarding S. 1631, at 3-4 (Feb. 13, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1035286/download (“The President has 
exclusive authority to identify the agents who will engage in diplomatic activity”); Letter 
from Prim F. Escalona to the Honorable James Inhofe (Nov. 27, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1222061/download at 6 (objecting that while a 
particular statutory provision “would allow the President to enter into a cybersecurity 
agreement with Russia through the Department of Defense, it would effectively disallow 
the President from using other agents, such as the Secretary of State, from doing the 
same”). 
61 For a sampling of examples, see Pub. L. 102-138 § 301, 105 Stat. 707 (1991) 
(providing that the Secretary of State “shall designate a high level official with 
responsibility for” developing a “proposal for the prosecution of Persian Gulf War 
criminals in an international tribunal, including proposing in the United Nations the 
establishment of such a tribunal, and advising the United States Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations in any discussion or negotiations concerning such matters”); Pub. L. 
99-239, 99 Stat. 1770 (Jan. 14, 1986) (providing that the President shall negotiate mutual 
legal assistance agreements with the Marshall Islands and that any “official designated by 
this joint resolution or by the President to negotiate any agreement under this section [] 
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when Congress specified by statute that “the Postmaster General may make 
arrangements with the postmasters in any foreign country for the reciprocal 
receipt and delivery of letters and packets.”62 
 
5. Power over Information 
 
A final power over diplomacy is power over information. To what 
extent can Congress mandate that the executive branch provide it with 
information related to diplomacy?  
This power over information is about oversight. If Congress has no 
authority to obtain information from the executive branch about diplomacy, 
then it cannot ensure that executive branch officials are acting wisely and 
lawfully. On the other hand, if confidential information is obtained by 
Congress and then inappropriately released, that may have problematic 
consequences for the United States on the international stage. 
Disputes between Congress and the President over access to diplomacy-
related information go back to the beginning of our constitutional history. In 
1794, President Washington withheld some information regarding 
diplomatic communications requested by the Senate, with his Attorney 
General reasoning that the Senate was not entitled to these papers unless its 
advice and consent was being sought for a relevant appointment or treaty.63 
Again, in 1796, Washington withheld papers related to the negotiation of 
the Jay Treaty from the House of Representatives, reasoning that the House 
had no role in treaty-making and thus no purpose for asking for the papers 
unless it was pursuing an impeachment.64 He observed that “the power of 
 
shall consult with affected law enforcement agencies prior to entering into such an 
agreement on behalf of the United States”); Pub. L. 96-283, 94 Stat. 575 (1980) (providing 
that a particular administrative official “in consultation with the Secretary of State … shall 
consult with foreign nations which enact, or are preparing to enact, domestic legislation 
establishing an interim legal framework” for mineral extraction); Pub. L. 84-1024 § 8, 70 
Stat. 1123 (1956) (“The Secretary of State shall designate the Secretary of the Interior [or a 
subordinate] … as a member of the United States delegation attending [international] 
meetings and conferences” about fish and wildlife” and “shall consult” with the Secretary 
of Interior with regard to all international aid that relates to fish and wildlife). 
Authorizations to specific agency actors were used as well for negotiations with Indian 
tribes. E.g., 17 Stat. 55 (1872) (“That the Secretary of the Interior be, and he is hereby, 
authorized and empowered to enter into negotiations with the Ute Indians”). 
62 Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239. 
63 George Washington, Message to the Senate of February 26, 1794, in JAMES D. 
RICHARDSON, 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 
(1897); Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Jan. 26, 1794), at 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-15-02-0099 (also suggesting that, 
in its legislative capacity, the Senate can consider papers but “the President interposes his 
discretion, so as to give them no more than, in his judgment, is fit to be given”). 
64 George Washington, Message to the House of Representatives of March 30, 1796, in 
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making treaties is exclusively vested in the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate” and “in fact all the papers affecting the 
negotiation … were laid before the Senate when the treaty itself was 
communicated for their consideration and advice.”65 
The Jay Treaty precedent might be thought to be comparatively modest. 
It involved a one-house resolution, not a statute.66 It involved papers given 
to the Senate but kept from the House based not on claims of presidential 
power but rather on the House’s lack of jurisdiction. And like many other 
precedents cited by the executive branch, it revealed not constitutional 
consensus but rather constitutional controversy. (After all, the House 
thought it should get to see the papers.) Yet this precedent has empowered a 
long line of periodic resistance by the executive branch to sharing 
diplomatic information with Congress.67 The executive branch now claims 
that “[i]nterwoven with the President’s constitutional authority to conduct 
diplomatic relations is his constitutional authority to determine whether to 
disclose the content of international negotiations.”68 In light of this, the 
“President … possesses, as a matter of constitutional law, the authority to 
exercise independent judgment about whether it is in the public interest to 
disclose such information to Congress.”69 OLC considers that “the 
President’s authority over diplomatic information, unlike certain other 
 
JAMES D. RICHARDSON, 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS (1897). 
65 Id.; see OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at 272 n. 62 (stating that 
“Washington relied in part on the exclusion of the House from the treaty power” but 
claiming that Washington was really asserting a broader power to “withhold documents 
when the public interest so required”).  
66 In an 1856 legal opinion, the Attorney General emphasized the difference between a 
one-house resolution and a statute with regard to the provision of information. Caleb 
Cushing, Resolutions of Congress, 6 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 680, 683 (1856) (stating that “except 
where otherwise provided by law,” a House resolution could not compel a Cabinet 
Secretary to provide information without the consent of the President and giving the 
example of a demand by the House for the Secretary of State to provide information about 
diplomatic instructions) (emphasis added). 
67 OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at 272-76 (discussing these 
precedents); OLC Opinion of Jan. 17, 2020, supra note 1. This claimed privilege has 
become wrapped up in “executive privilege,” a broader concept that derives in part from 
diplomatic privilege. 
68 OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at 267; see also, e.g. DOJ Letter of 
Mar. 8, 2018, supra note 2, at 4 https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1041156/download 
(objecting to disclosure to congressional staff with proper security clearances); Letter from 
Samuel R. Ramer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, to Bob 
Corker, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Regarding H.R. 1644, at 
2 (June 5, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1058581/download (citing a 
“constitutional authority to maintain the confidentiality of diplomatic communications” in 
objecting to a draft bill’s various reporting requirements related to North Korea). 
69 OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at 268. 
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constitutionally grounded privileges, is not subject to balancing: it is 
absolute.”70 
The exclusive power to withhold information claimed by the executive 
branch has long existed in tandem with numerous congressional statutes 
requiring the provision of diplomacy-related information.71 Reporting 
requirements are quite common. In supporting U.S. participation in the 
United Nations, for example, Congress mandated that “The President shall 
… not less than once each year, make reports to the Congress of the 
activities of the United Nations and of the United States within.”72 
Similarly, Congress has sought on occasion to bring administrative law 
practices relating to notice and comment into the conduct of agencies 
abroad. A 1994 statute, for example, provides that the U.S. agency engaged 
in international phytosanitary standard-setting shall give annual notice and 
an opportunity to comment with respect to upcoming negotiations and “the 
agenda for United States participation, if any.”73 
The tension between these two positions has been mitigated historically 
by the President’s willingness to share information related to international 
engagement in practice. In a 1996 memo determining that Congress could 
not use its appropriations power to compel the disclosure of negotiations 
regarding Mexico’s currency crisis, for example, OLC nonetheless 
emphasized that the executive branch had disclosed almost all the requested 
information.74 Such an institutional balance is dependent on norms, 
however, and is vulnerable to disregard by an administration. The Trump 
administration notably refused to provide Congress with a statutorily 
mandated copy of a report related to potential automobile tariffs and 
rejected demands by the House of Representatives for information relating 
 
70 Id. at 277 (citing for authority to two never-published OLC opinions). 
71 For a few examples of statutory mandates for disclosure, see Pub. L. 99-239, 99 
Stat. 1770 (Jan. 14, 1986) (providing that President, in consultation with the U.S. 
Comptroller General, shall negotiate agreements that give the General Accounting Office 
certain auditing powers with respect to aid programs to Micronesia and that the 
Comptroller General shall have “access to the personnel and … records, documents, 
working papers, automated data and files, and such information relevant to such audits”); 
Pub. L. 98-164, 97 Stat. 1022 (1983) (“Prior to the 1985 [international] Conference, the 
President shall report to the Congress on the nature of the preparations, the adherence to the 
original goals of the Conference, and the extent of any continued U.S. participation and 
support for the Conference”).  
72 Pub. L. 79-264, 59 Stat. 619 (Dec. 20, 1945); see also 22 USC § 287b (codifying 
this and numerous other reporting requirements related to the United Nations).   
73 Pub. L. 103-465 § 491, 108 Stat. 4971 (1994).  
74 OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at 256-57, 259-60 (describing 
substantial disclosure and an eventual negotiated agreement “regarding the small number 
of White House documents withheld under the public interest exception”). 
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to President Trump’s dealings with Russia.75 More generally, under the 
Trump administration, the Department of Justice became far more strident 
in claiming that reporting requirements raise “constitutional concern[s]” 
without even considering whether the public interests do or do not favor 
disclosure.76 One 2019 letter sent by the Department of Justice to Congress 
complained that all six reporting-related obligations in a proposed statute 
aimed at sanctioning Hamas “would unconstitutionally intrude on the 
President’s authority to control the dissemination of national security 
information and diplomatic communications.”77 
 
B.  The President’s Practical Control over Contested Diplomatic Powers 
 
In his Youngstown concurrence, Justice Jackson explained that “[w]hen 
the President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will 
of Congress, his power is at the lowest ebb. … Courts can sustain exclusive 
presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from 
acting upon the subject.”78 He warned that “Presidential claim to a power at 
once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for 
what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional 
system.”79 
Underlying this famous language is the assumption of judicial review. 
Justice Jackson presumed that courts would be determining those exclusive 
presidential powers. Unlike the political branches, the courts are not 
patently self-interested in the constitutional balance of power between 
Congress and the President. Their comparative institutional credibility 
makes it plausible that they can undertake the robust scrutiny envisioned by 
 
75 E.g., Letter from Prim F. Escalona, Principal Deputy Attorney General, Office of 
Legislative Affairs, to Eliot L. Engel, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs Regarding H.R. 2529, at 1 (Feb. 11, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1248726/download [hereinafter DOJ Letter of Feb. 
11, 2020]; OLC Opinion of Jan. 17, 2020, supra note 1, at 12-14; Letter from Pat a. 
Cippollone, White House Counsel, to Elijah E. Cummings, Chairman of the House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform et al. (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000169-a165-d9c1-a7ef-f5effbf10001; OLC Opinion of 
Jan. 17, 2020, supra note 1, at 1-2, 11-14. 
76 E.g., DOJ Letter of Feb. 11, 2020, supra note 76, at 1, 
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1248726/download (stating, without analyzing the 
interests at stake, that two reporting requirements in a draft bill “would contravene the 
diplomatic-communications component of executive privilege”). 
77 Letter from Prim F. Escalona, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Eliot 
Engel, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Regarding H.R. 1850, at 2-3 
(Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/olp/page/file/1203301/download. 
78 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
79 Id. 
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Justice Jackson.  
Yet only rarely have courts considered the constitutional allocation of 
the diplomatic powers. It was not until 2015, in Zivotofsky, that the Supreme 
Court squarely addressed the exclusivity of one piece of the bundle of 
diplomatic powers and held that the recognition power was exclusive to the 
President.80 While evidence from the time of the Framing, and historical 
practice comfortably support an exclusive presidential power over another 
piece of the bundle – the representation power81 — it is judicially unsettled 
to what extent the President has exclusive power over the content, agents, 
and information related to U.S. international engagement. The Court, in 
Zivotofsky, made clear that it was only addressing exclusivity with respect 
to the recognition power.82 
Without the courts, it is left to the political branches to sort out their 
respective powers – and this sorting does not lend itself to Justice Jackson’s 
admonition that claims of exclusive presidential power “must be scrutinized 
with caution.”83 Rather, it creates a dynamic where the executive branch 
can always win if it really wants to. The executive branch is far better 
positioned than Congress both to articulate its legal positions and to 
implement them in practice.  
With respect to the articulation of legal positions, the executive branch 
has enormous institutional capacity to put towards asserting exclusive 
powers. It has regiments of lawyers at OLC and elsewhere who are 
committed to protecting its prerogatives.84 Indeed, an OLC opinion 
provides that “[w]here the President believes that [a congressional] 
enactment unconstitutionally limits his powers, he has the authority to 
defend his office and decline to above by it, unless he is convinced that the 
Court would disagree with his assessment.”85 Through letters, signing 
 
80 Review of the exclusivity of the diplomatic powers from lower courts has similarly 
been minimal. An exception is a 1993 case in which a majority of a Ninth Circuit panel 
held, with minimal reasoning, that a statute requiring the Secretary of State to initiate 
certain negotiations regarding sea turtles could not be enforced because it “impinge[d] 
upon power exclusively granted to the Executive Branch under the Constitution.” Earth 
Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1993). 
81 E.g., United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (“The President … is the 
constitutional representative of the United States in its dealings with foreign nations”).   
82 576 U.S. at 20.   
83 Id. 
84 Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUMBIA L. 
REV. 1448, 1459-63 (2010); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss 
and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 441-444 (2012) (discussing the 
institutional advantages of the executive branch). 
85 Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Counsel to the President, Regarding Presidential Authority To Decline To 
Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, OLC (Nov. 2, 1994), 
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statements, memoranda, and other tools, the executive branch has built up 
an arsenal of internal precedents asserting exclusive rights with respect to 
diplomatic content, agents, and information. Congress, by contrast, has no 
institutional parallel to OLC, and members of Congress have less incentives 
to defend its institutional prerogatives.86 
The executive branch also has greater institutional capacity to 
implement its perceived rights. During the legislative process, executive 
branch officials can resist perceived congressional overreaching by asking 
for changes in draft bills, and the President can issue signing statements.87 
And the executive branch has even greater institutional powers after the 
legislation has passed. It can construe congressional statutes narrowly to 
avoid perceived interference with its asserted exclusive powers. Most 
importantly, it can disregard statutory provisions altogether, even when 
Congress is exercising its potent power of the purse.88  
This is not to say that the executive branch will always disregard 
congressional mandates or preferences relating to diplomacy. Far from it. 
These interests will often align and, even when they do not, executive 
branch actors can face strong, pragmatic incentives to accommodate 
congressional views. This may be especially true where the actions of 
agencies rather than the White House are at stake. Kristina Daugirdas’s 
work here is informative. She studied the extent to which the Treasury 
Department implemented congressional directives regarding how to vote in 
international financial organizations after the executive branch started 
raising constitutional objections to these directives during the George H.W. 
Bush presidency. In an illustration of the daylight between constitutional 
assertions and practice, she found that “President Bush’s constitutional 
objections had no impact on the Treasury Department’s long-standing 
practice of implementing Congress’s negotiating instructions” and this trend 
generally continued in subsequent years.89 
 
https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc110294.html. 
86 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 84, at 443. 
87 The President can also use the veto power, but this is less likely to occur. The 
President might wish to gain the passage of the legislation if the objectionable portions are 
only a small piece of it – as is often the case with “must pass” annual bills like the National 
Defense Authorization Act. The presidential incentives to use the veto are also lessened 
under the current equilibrium by the fact that the President considers himself or herself 
empowered to disregard statutory provisions that OLC views as unconstitutional 
infringements on executive power. 
88 E.g., OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2, at 4; OLC Opinion of May 15, 
1996, supra note 26, at 194; OLC Opinion of Feb. 16, 1990, supra note 39, at 41; see also 
Price, supra note 6, at 450 (“While Congress routinely conditions appropriations on 
particular diplomatic constraints, the executive branch just as routinely claims authority to 
disregard those conditions”). 
89 Daugirdas, supra note 6, at 544-49. 
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Congress can also cast a powerful indirect shadow on the conduct of 
U.S. international engagement through laws that are fully within its power. 
Much of U.S. international engagement today involves negotiations with 
other countries about how the executive branch will use powers that 
Congress has delegated to it. Will the President impose or waive economic 
sanctions on a particular country? What standards will the Environmental 
Protection Agency set under the Clean Air Act with respect to climate 
emissions? If Congress changes the underlying statutes – or delegates 
further powers to the President – this will inevitably affect negotiating 
leverage and outcomes. Similarly, Congress can make funding decisions 
related to foreign policy that will have collateral effects on negotiations. If 
Congress refuses to fund any international organizations that treat Palestine 
as a state, then the United States may no longer be able to participate as a 
dues-paying member in these international organizations. Legislation in 
these spaces will influence how the executive branch engages with 
counterparts abroad. 
Yet at the end of the day, the President or other executive branch 
officials can now choose to disregard any statutory mandate that conflicts 
with OLC’s sweeping views of the president’s exclusive diplomatic powers. 
And they have done so even in the administrations of President Clinton and 
President Obama, notwithstanding the general perception that Democratic 
presidents are less likely to claim exclusive executive powers.90 As for the 
Trump administration, it proved especially aggressive in withholding 
information related to international affairs from Congress, including 
virtually all documents related to President Trump’s first impeachment.91 In 
the fall of 2020, the Trump administration also relied in part on the 
president’s supposedly exclusive powers over the content of diplomacy in 
withdrawing the United States from an important treaty –the Open Skies 
Treaty – in a manner that conflicted with a statutory mandate.92 To date, the 
 
90 E.g., OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2; OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, 
supra note 45, at 272. 
91 OLC Opinion of Jan. 17, 2020, supra note 1, at 1-2, 11-14 (offering several 
interrelated reasons, including diplomatic power, in withholding a memorandum related to 
automobile tariffs); see generally Memorandum from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney 
General, Office of Legal Counsel, to the White House Counsel, Regarding House 
Committee’s Authority to Investigate for Impeachment (Jan. 19, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1236346/download (setting out convoluted arguments for 
withholding impeachment-related documents and asserting, among these arguments, that 
executive privilege “continues to be available during an impeachment investigation.”).  
92 OLC Opinion of Sept. 22, 2020, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that “Congress may not 
constitutionally dictate the modes and means by which the President engages in 
international diplomacy” and therefore “may not compel, restrict, or delay the President’s 
diplomatic conduct in the first instance, including in questions of timing”) (quotation marks 
and citations to another OLC memorandum omitted). The statute in question required the 
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Biden administration has been less overtly energetic in using the exclusive 
executive powers over diplomacy claimed by previous administrations. 
Even if the Biden administration does not wield these asserted powers, 




II. THE FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLES OVER WHAT COUNTS AS 
DIPLOMACY 
 
Executive branch lawyers not only claim exclusive presidential powers 
over diplomacy, but also characterize “diplomacy” in sweeping terms. They 
have “treated widely varied subject matters as falling within the President’s 
exclusive authority over diplomacy” and consider the “President’s authority 
over international negotiations as extending to any subject that has bearing 
on the national interest.”93 They conceptualize diplomacy to cover 
everything from policy formulation to the casting of votes in international 
organizations. By defining diplomacy broadly for constitutional purposes, 
executive branch lawyers vastly enlarge the reach of the president’s 
assertedly exclusive powers over the content of U.S. international 
engagement, the agents who undertake it, and information related to it. 
This broad constitutional conception of “diplomacy” is far from 
inevitable. As this Part shows, there was no coherent meaning of 
“diplomacy” at the time of the Framing. Indeed, the word “diplomacy” was 
barely (if at all) an English word at the time of the Framing and, as best I 
can tell, it was never used during in the discourse over the Constitution’s 
drafting and ratification. Instead, “[j]ust what [the Framers] did envision, or 
would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be 
divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called 
upon to interpret for Pharaoh.”94 It is far from clear that the Framers wished 
the President to have exclusive power over treaty negotiations. And it takes 
many further leaps of logic to conclude, as the executive branch now does, 
that the Framers entrusted the executive branch with exclusive control over 
U.S. negotiations that are conducted by U.S. administrators rather than 
 
President to give early notice to Congress before withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty. 
See id. at 1. Had the executive branch complied with the statute, then withdrawal would 
have not been able to be effectuated until the new presidential administration – a prospect 
that the Trump administration very much wanted to avoid. In addition to an asserted 
exclusive presidential power over diplomacy, this OLC opinion also rested on an asserted 
exclusive presidential power to execute treaties. See id. at 2. 
93 OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2, at 5 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
94 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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diplomats, involve international regulatory coordination, and will never be 
brought to the Senate for advice and consent. 
This Part sets forth four ways in which our conception of “diplomacy” 
could be cabined for purposes of any exclusive executive powers that can be 
derived from it. Each of these ways is a “road not taken” in executive 
branch practice, with antecedents in constitutional history that have gone 
unrealized. One way is structural: to limit presidential exclusivity related to 
negotiations to the conduct of these negotiations rather than also 
encompassing the formation of policy objectives on the front end or certain 
international legal outcomes on the back end. A second way is content-
based: to define “diplomacy” as encompassing only particular subject 
matters. A third way is institutional: to define diplomacy in terms of 
diplomats rather than allowing exclusive presidential powers over 
diplomacy to attach to any executive branch official engaged in 
international discourse. A fourth way would focus on international context 
and exclude U.S. participation in international organizations from the reach 
of any exclusive presidential powers over diplomatic content, agents, and 
information. I offer these four lost limits not as firm prescriptions but rather 
as possibilities. My purpose in this Part is neither to offer specific 
prescriptions (a topic that I tentatively turn to in Part III) nor to give an 
exhaustive historical accounting of these four possible limits. Rather, it is to 
demonstrate that the executive branch’s sweeping definition of “diplomacy” 
is neither constitutionally predetermined nor conceptually mandated.  
 
A. The Delphic Framing 
 
The Constitution does not use any variant of the word “diplomacy.” At 
the time of the Framing, such vocabulary barely existed in the English 
language. The French terminology of a “corps diplomatique” – a cohort of 
envoys and ministers – was known to and used by some of the Framers,95 
and “diplomat” eventually became an English word, likely after the 
Founding.96  The word “diplomatic” referred originally to the authenticity 
 
95 E.g., Letter of John Adams to Edmund Jenings, Sept. 16, 1782, at 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-13-02-0200 (“The Corps Diplomatique 
here, all Speak of the Independence of America as decided … I meet now the whole Corps 
Diplomatique, at Court, at the House of France and that of Spain”). 
96 Dictionaries date its first use to 1813, but I have found one usage in the late 1790s. 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (entry for diplomat; second edition version) 
(identifying no usage earlier than 1813); Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diplomat (also identifying 1813 as the year 
of the first known use); Letter from William Vans Murray to John Adams of July 1, 1798, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-2688 (observing challenges in 
Europe that arise for “a diplomat of strict honor”). I thank the Virginia Law Review editors 
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of documents and, by the 1780s, was only beginning to develop a 
connection to international relations.97  As for the word “diplomacy” itself, 
dictionaries date its first uses of “diplomacy” to the mid-to-late eighteenth 
century.98 “Diplomacy” is entirely absent from the twenty-eight volume 
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution,99 and its first 
 
for search suggestions related to this and some other terminology discussed in this 
paragraph.  
97 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (entry for diplomatic; second edition 
version) (dating the first use of “diplomatic” as it related to international relations to the 
1780s). During debates over the Constitution’s adoption, none of the scant uses of 
“diplomatic” included in the multi-volume Documentary History of the Ratification of the 
Constitution  involves a claim about powers exclusive to the president. Author’s search 
conducted on https://rotunda-upress-virginia-
edu.proxy.library.upenn.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=RNCN-info-search-refine 
(producing only 20 uses of “diplomatic” after omitting those usages added in the editorial 
notes). Of these 20 uses, many drew an explicit or implicit distinction between the 
Congress under the Articles of Confederation, which served as a “diplomatic” forum for 
conversations between states, and the new federal government with its more robust powers. 
In the New York ratification debates, for example, Robert Livingston specifically 
contrasted the role of a “mere diplomatic body, making engagements for its respective 
States,” with a body that “was to enjoy legislative, judicial, and executive powers.” THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: VOLUME XXII, 
NEW YORK 1687. Of the few usages of “diplomatic” that referred to specific branches of 
the new government, two referred to one or both branches of Congress, two described the 
Senate and President in combination, and none referred to the President alone. See THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: VOLUME XXVII, 
SOUTH CAROLINA 91 (in which Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, discussing the treaty-making 
power during the South Carolina ratification debates, observed that “the president and 
senate joined were, therefore … deemed the most eligible corps in whom we could with 
safety vest the diplomatic authority of the union”); id. at 116 (in which Pinckney made a 
similar statement); id. at 336 (in which Pinckney stated “that the senate were a diplomatic 
body”); DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: VOLUME 
XVII, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, NO. 5, at 123 (in which John Dickinson, 
writing as Fabius, remarked that the “house of representatives … and the senate will 
actually be not only legislative but also diplomatic bodies, perpetually engaged in the 
arduous task of reconciling, in their determinations, the interests of several sovereign 
states”). The word “diplomatic” appears once in The Federalist, where Alexander 
Hamilton used it in passing. Federalist 81 (“Though consuls have not in strictness a 
diplomatic character, yet they are public agents of the nations to which they belong”).  
98 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary puts the first known usage in 1766. 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diplomacy (not identifying this usage).  The 
first usage identified by the Oxford English Dictionary occurred in Edmund Burke’s 1796 
writings on the French Revolution. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (entry for 
diplomacy; second edition version).  
99 A search for the word “diplomacy” in the twenty-eight volume Documentary 
History of the Ratification of the Constitution returns zero results. Author’s search 
conducted on https://rotunda-upress-virginia-
edu.proxy.library.upenn.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=RNCN-info-search-refine. 
Draft    35 
uses in the Corpus of Founding Era American English database occur in the 
1790s (mainly in connection to France).100 In other words, any time we now 
talk about the constitutional power over “diplomacy,” we are using a term 
that was not in the common lexicon of the Framers at the time of the 
formation of the Constitution.  
To the extent that the Framers had a comparable term, it was “negotiate” 
and its variants like “negotiation.” These words were sometimes used 
broadly, as when James Madison described the powers of the federal 
government as “principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, 
and foreign commerce.”101 Other times these words were used to refer 
narrowly to bargaining with foreign nations over the terms that would go in 
treaties. John Jay’s Federalist No. 64, for example, focuses on the 
“negotiation of treaties.”102 He observes that the President may need to 
gather intelligence from those who “would rely on the secrecy of the 
President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate” and notes that, 
in pursuing negotiating objectives, “should any circumstance occur which 
requires the advice and consent of the Senate, [the President] may at any 
time convene them.”103 
 
100 A search for “diplomacy” in the Corpus of Founding Era American English 
database returns 18 uses (including some false positives and duplicates), of which most 
relate to U.S. relations with France. Author’s search conducted on 
https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/cofea/concordances/search. The earliest clear usage among these 
results comes from 1793, where affiliates of George Washington use this term in 
translating a letter sent to Washington from the revolutionary government of France.  Letter 
to George Washington from the Provisional Executive Council of France, Jan. 1793 
(subsequent English translation done in the handwriting of Tobias Lear, Washington’s 
personal secretary, with input from Thomas Jefferson and possibly another person), at 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-12-02-0050 (stating that “the 
Republic [of France] fervently desires to strengthen bands too much neglected by the 
ancient diplomacy of the royal government”).  By contrast, a search for “negotiation” in the 
same database turns up more than 3000 results.  Author’s search conducted on 
https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/cofea/concordances/search.  [Michael – thank you for your 
suggestions; this section has been updated considerably in light of them.] 
101 Federalist No. 45 (Madison). 
102 Federalist No. 64 (John Jay). 
103 Id. Dubiously, an OLC memorandum by William Barr reads Federalist No. 64 as 
making it an “essential element of the Founders’ vision” that “the Constitution mandates 
Presidential control over the disclosure of negotiations.” OLC Opinion of Feb. 16, 1990, 
supra note 40, at 42. By contrast, a 2009 OLC memorandum (the most restrained in 
modern times) that cites to Federalist No. 64 describes the President only as having 
“significant discretion” over negotiations. OLC Opinion of June 1, 2009, supra note 40. 
For another example of a narrow use of negotiation from early constitutional practice, 
see George Washington, Letter of Introduction Conferring Full Powers on John Jay (May 
6, 1794), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, OF 
THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: FOREIGN RELATIONS 471 (1833) (authorizing Jay 
to “agree, treat, consult, and negotiate” with British ministers and separately authorizing 
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Whatever the terminology, the Constitution’s text does not establish 
exclusive presidential power over what OLC now terms diplomacy. It gives 
Congress extensive foreign affairs powers related to war and commerce, 
makes the President Commander-in-Chief, provides that the President will 
obtain the advice and consent of the Senate for treaties and ambassadorial 
appointments, and authorizes the President to receive ambassadors.104 
Given the lack of specificity about diplomacy, it is no surprise that textual 
claims by OLC to exclusive presidential diplomatic powers tend to be short 
on analysis and big on conclusions. One 1990 OLC opinion by William 
Barr defends the President’s “broad authority over the Nation’s diplomatic 
affairs” by citing generally to the first three sections of Article II of the 
Constitution – without deigning to mention the existence of Article I.105 
Indeed, the written Constitution does not clearly give the President any 
authority to disobey congressional statutes. Article II vests “[t]he executive 
power” in the President and obligates the President to “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.”106 Recent scholarship argues that the Vesting 
Clause only gives the President the power to execute the law107 and that 
 
him “to conclude and sign a treaty or treaties”). 
104 See generally U.S. CONST. arts. 1 & 2. 
105 More specifically, the memorandum states: 
The President possesses broad authority over the Nation’s diplomatic affairs. That 
authority flows from his position as head of the unitary Executive and as 
Commander in Chief. E.g., U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 2, & 3. … Article II, Section 2 
of the Constitution also gives the President the specific authority to ‘appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.’ These constitutional 
provisions authorize the President to determine the form and manner in which the 
United States will maintain relations with foreign nations, and further to determine 
the individuals who will conduct these relations.” 
OLC Opinion of Feb. 16, 1990, supra note 40, at 38 (concluding that therefore the 
statute at issue is “clearly unconstitutional”). The impressive leaps in reasoning contained 
in this paragraph are not further explained. In addition to not even mentioning Congress’s 
numerous Article I powers related to foreign affairs, the memorandum neglects to note that 
the appointment power is shared with the Senate. For another OLC opinion with reasoning 
that closely tracks this one, see OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at 267. 
Other OLC opinions do make passing mention to Congress’s Article I powers. E.g., OLC 
Opinion of June 1, 2009, supra note 40, at 4-5; OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 
2, at 4. 
106 U.S. CONST. art 2, §§ 1, 3. 
107 See generally Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the 
Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169 (2019) (arguing that “executive power” only 
conveyed the power to execute laws). The Vesting Clause gets fairly light treatment in 
OLC memoranda related to diplomacy, although it appears to be read capaciously in at 
least some of them. E.g., OLC Opinion of Jan. 17, 2020, supra note 1, at 7 (asserting that 
“[e]xecutive privilege is a ‘constitutionally based’ ‘corollary of the executive function 
vested in the President by Article II of the Constitution,” and it empowers the President to 
withhold confidential information from the other Branches and the public when necessary 
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historical evidence relating to the Take Care Clause puts “a thumb on the 
scale in favor of the view that the President must carry out federal 
statutes.”108 These accounts further unsettle any textually grounded claims 
to exclusive presidential powers over diplomacy. 
Early practice from the Framing Era is a similarly thin reed on which to 
rest current executive branch assertions about exclusive diplomatic powers. 
As discussed in the prior Part, this practice is not particularly strong in 
establishing exclusive presidential power with respect to content, agents, 
and information. Many of these precedents were more about independent 
presidential powers than exclusive presidential powers, such as early 
practice that established that the President did not need to receive the advice 
and consent of the Senate prior to treaty negotiation.109 And where 
exclusivity was implicated, its scope was limited. Scattered indications that 
the President should have exclusive control over treaty negotiations were 
tied to the knowledge that, prior to ratification, the Senate would have a full 
opportunity to review the end product of these negotiations in giving or 
withholding its advice and consent.110 Early precedents in which the 
President withheld documents from legislators reflected constitutional 
controversy rather than consensus, occurred only in respect to one-House 
requests rather than in response to legislated obligations, and came with 
clear recognition that these chambers would be entitled to the documents 
under particular conditions.111 
More fundamentally, early practice involved a different vision of 
international engagement that exists today. It was carried out through 
treaties rather than ongoing conversations, framed by a sharp distinction 
between foreign affairs and domestic ones, conducted by diplomats rather 
than all kinds of governmental officials, and centered around private 
bilateral negotiations without any formalized international organizations. 
By taking contested claims of exclusive presidential power from this setting 
 
to support that function”).  Other scholars have read the Vesting Clause as conferring more 
robust powers, particularly in the foreign affairs context.  See PRAKASH, supra note 16, at 
188 (claiming that the “executive power” included authority to “decide what to say to” 
other countries).  Others have simply remarked on the indeterminacy of this Vesting 
Clause.  As one scholar wrote long ago, the Vesting Clause “was to prove a ‘joker’” – a 
wild card in the deck of clauses that “admitted an interpretation of executive power which 
would give to the President a field of action much wider than that outlined by the 
enumerated powers.” CHARLES C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789, 
at 138-39 (1922) (adding “[w]ith the correctness or incorrectness of this interpretation, we 
are not concerned”). 
108 Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Bed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution 
and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2186 (2019). 
109 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
110 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
111 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
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and mapping it onto the wider world of modern “diplomacy,” the executive 
branch has effectuated a vast shift of exclusive power to the presidency. 
 
B. Four Lost Limits on “Diplomacy” 
 
The specific conversations between U.S. Presidents and their Russian 
counterparts about arms control treaties are obviously within our 
constitutional conception of diplomacy. But what about the policy 
objectives pursued by U.S Department of Treasury officials at an 
international gathering of insurance regulators? The executive branch thinks 
that this is also “diplomacy” for U.S. constitutional purposes,112 apparently 
on the assumption that any executive branch interactions with foreign 
counterparts fall into this paradigm.  
The executive branch’s sweeping view of “diplomacy” is not 
constitutionally foreordained. In what follows, I suggest four narrower ways 
that “diplomacy” could be conceptualized for constitutional purposes. Each 
of these ways has antecedents in constitutional practice, although some have 
stronger roots and would be more feasible to implement than others. 
 
1. Negotiating Process 
 
In 1939, the British diplomat Harold Nicolson published a treatise titled 
Diplomacy. He felt impelled, in that fateful year, to address the “the mistake 
… in confusing policy with negotiation and in calling [both] by the same ill-
favoured name of ‘Diplomacy.’”113 Instead, he explained, policy should be 
considered the “‘legislative’ aspect” of diplomacy, while negotiation was 
“its ‘executive’ aspect,” and different actors should have final authority 
over each sphere.114 
Drawing on this insight, one way to limit any exclusive presidential 
powers over diplomacy would be to confine our constitutional conception 
of diplomacy to negotiation rather than to policy. Under this approach, 
Congress could, if it chose, establish U.S. foreign policy objectives and 
review any substantive products of diplomacy before their finalization (such 
as the signing of international agreements, the finalization of soft law 
commitments, or the casting of votes in international organizations). 
Exclusive presidential powers over diplomacy, if any, would be limited to 
tactical decisions about how best to achieve these objectives in negotiations. 
The President would retain the independent power to act against a backdrop 
of congressional silence, but not the power to disregard congressional 
 
112 See generally DOJ Letter of Mar. 8, 2018, supra note 2. 
113 HAROLD NICOLSON, DIPLOMACY 12 (1939).  
114 Id. 
Draft    39 
mandates over policy objectives or ultimate outputs. This approach could 
apply across the board with the possible exception of the making of Article 
II treaties, where the President’s need for the Senate’s advice and consent 
provides more than adequate legislative oversight. 
This approach builds on the Constitution’s structural commitment to 
checks and balances. As noted earlier, it is an anachronism to map the word 
“diplomacy” back onto the Framing, for “negotiation” is in fact the proper 
term from that era. And the dominant vision from that time was not 
unfettered presidential control over foreign policy. Rather it was one of 
shared control between the President and the Senate. The President would 
be responsible for “the management of foreign negotiations … according to 
general principles concerted with the Senate, and subject to their final 
concurrence.”115 The Senate was to have both a role in setting negotiating 
objectives and the power to approve or disapprove the product of 
negotiations – the treaty – before it took effect. While the Senate’s role in 
setting negotiating objectives has ceased to be an obligatory part of the 
treaty process, the Senate’s advice and consent power continues to provide 
a major structural check on presidential power for treaties brought to it. 
But most “diplomacy” today is not about the negotiation of treaties that 
will receive the advice and consent of the Senate – or even about the 
negotiation of international agreements that will receive subsequent 
congressional approval. Rather, it is about continuously ongoing exchanges 
between U.S. executive branch officials and foreign counterparts, 
sometimes mediated through international organizations and often involving 
how the executive branch will use powers delegated by Congress (like the 
power to impose sanctions). It would be unfeasible and unworkable to 
expect Congress to approve all these exchanges. But, for these exchanges, 
should Congress be able, if it chooses, to set negotiating objectives or 
disapprove the making of a particular international commitment or the 
casting of a particular international vote?  
Under the approach now taken by the executive branch, Congress 
cannot set negotiating objectives and has power over substantive results 
only indirectly to the extent that these results depend for their 
implementation on domestic law. These indirect powers are of course 
significant. The content of existing federal laws (and the possibility of 
changes to these laws) will inevitably influence the stances taken by 
executive branch officials, and these officials may also take to heart the 
views of individual, influential members of the House or Senate. But 
influence is different from ultimate control, and the approach taken by the 
executive branch treats ultimate control over both policy and negotiation as 
 
115 Federalist No. 84 (Hamilton) (emphasis added). 
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squarely with the President. By contrast, recognizing that Congress has the 
ultimate power to assert control over U.S. foreign policy objectives and 
over eventual outputs is more consistent with the broader constitutional 
premise of legislative oversight.  
The concept of congressional control over policy objectives has 
antecedents in historical practice. As mentioned earlier, Daniel Webster 
took this position in the 1820s in debates over whether to appropriate 
money to send a U.S. diplomat to an international conference – an event 
that was a forerunner to modern multilateral engagement.116 As one Senator 
put it almost a century later, one can “agree … that the President has the 
exclusive right of the conduct of our foreign relations, conducting 
diplomatic intercourse, and negotiating treaties; but there is a grave 
difference … between the President’s right to conduct our foreign relations 
and the question of what our foreign policy shall be.”117 And especially 
with trade, but with other matters as well, congressional statutes have long 
specified the “policy of the United States” with respect to matters of foreign 
affairs – even if executive branch officials have not always honored these 
principles.118 This approach would parallel the boundary that some have 
drawn between Congress’s war powers and any exclusive powers held by 
the President as the Commander-in-Chief – a boundary in which Congress 
has overall control but the president has certain exclusive tactical powers on 
the battleground.119  
An approach that limited the President’s exclusive constitutional power 
over diplomacy to negotiation rather than to policy formation would 
continue to leave the President with vast control. The President’s role in the 
legislative process is a powerful tool for resisting the inclusion of 
congressional mandates into statutes in the first place, and control over the 
negotiating process would vest the executive branch with considerable 
discretion. Moreover, the lines between negotiating objectives, the actual 
negotiations, and the outputs of negotiations are not easy to draw. A 
statutory requirement that executive branch official wait several months to 
 
116 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
117 64 Cong. Rec. 1219 (1923) (statement of Sen. Brandegee) (adding that “I never 
have thought, and do not now think, that the president has a right, of his own motion, to 
decide what the foreign policy of the United States of America shall be and to go ahead and 
put it in operation in spite of the wishes of the Congress or of the people of the country”). 
118 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.   
119 For a discussion and critique of the assumption that the President has certain 
exclusive constitutional powers over tactics on the battleground, see David J. Barron & 
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – Framing the Problem, 
Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008); David J. Barron & 
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – A Constitutional 
History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008). 
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finalize an agreement (or to give notice of a withdrawal from an agreement) 
would seem clearly within Congress’s power under this approach, as this 
provision would be designed to give Congress an opportunity for review 
substantive outcomes.120 But what about a congressional statute mandating 
that particular negotiations begin within a year? Would that be permissible 
as policy on the part of Congress or impermissible as negotiation? Yet 
though blurry and limited in its effect, drawing lines between policy, 
negotiation, and outputs for constitutional purposes would nonetheless 
empower Congress in comparison to the sweeping vision of exclusive 
executive control over diplomacy now asserted by the executive branch. 
 
2. Subject Matter 
 
At the time of the Framing, when the word diplomacy did not exist, 
negotiations between nations centered mainly around war, peace, trade, 
alliance, and treatment of foreign nationals. Now nations interact not only 
around these topics, but also around almost everything else: health, crime, 
individual rights, tax, finance, migration, investment, labor, intellectual 
property, and the environment.121  
Executive branch lawyers today consider all these interactions to fall 
under the umbrella of “diplomacy” – and therefore to fall with exclusive 
executive control. The overall effect is a vast accrual of structural power for 
the Presidency, even if we assume (dubiously) that the full bundle of 
diplomatic powers described earlier did in fact belong exclusively to 
President at the time of the Framing. Because diplomacy now encompasses 
so much more than it once did, the President’s control over diplomacy is a 
far more significant power. 
Historical practice holds hints of narrower ways to define “diplomacy” 
for constitutional purposes. Taking stock of the constitutional separation of 
powers with respect to diplomacy in a 1926 article in the American Journal 
of International Law, Henry Wriston noted a distinction between 
 
120 Congress has recognized indirect powers in these areas – for example, if the 
executive branch negotiates an international commitment in which it agrees to use 
delegated discretion to waive congressionally-imposed sanctions, Congress can remove the 
underlying executive branch discretion. Cf. Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, 
Pub. L. 114-17 at § 2, 121 Stat. 201 (2015) (providing that the President could not waive 
sanctions on Iran during a specified time period (thirty or sixty days, depending on the start 
date) after the finalized agreement had been provided to Congress). Although this is an 
important authority, it is different from the power to mandate that the executive branch 
wait to finalize an international commitment in the first place.  
121 See ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 5 (2004) (explaining that 
nations now “relate to each other not only through the Foreign Office, but also through 
regulatory … channels”).  
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international conferences of a “political or diplomatic character” and those 
of a “technical and scientific matter.”122 Wriston focused in particular on a 
1913 statute requiring that “the Executive shall not extend or accept any 
invitation to participate in any international congress, conference, or like 
event, without first having specific authority of law to do so.”123 Wriston 
considered this statute a “legislative trespass on historic executive 
functions” and approved of the executive branch’s approach of largely 
ignoring this statute, claiming that “there was already ample provision for 
preventing the President from entering upon binding commitments at 
conferences.”124 Yet he observed that the executive branch has complied 
with the statute for some “conferences of less important character” like an 
international conference on education, although it had “acted with 
considerable boldness” in disregarding the statute for conferences that were 
“manifestly diplomatic and political in character” like the Paris Peace 
Conference.125 
As suggested by Wriston’s reasoning and the practice he describes, we 
could envision “diplomacy” very differently from how the executive branch 
treats it today. The early “technical and scientific” conferences mentioned 
by Wriston can be seen as forerunners for international standard-setting and 
international regulatory cooperation. Such activity is less about ordering the 
public relations between nations and more about coordination among 
nations in order to regulate their own subjects. It is an example of how the 
distinction between foreign and domestic affairs has faded in our 
increasingly interconnected world.  
It is possible to envision a constitutional concept of “diplomacy” 
centered around matters that are “political” rather than “technical” in nature. 
 
122 Wriston, supra note 57, at 35, 40, 41, 44 (1926) (suggesting that the executive 
branch has been more willing to ignore congressional restrictions with respect to 
international conferences “manifestly diplomatic and political in character” but less so with 
respect to “conferences of less important character”). For a view along these lines 
expressed by a former Supreme Court justice, see Abe Fortas, Comments on The 
Presidency as I Have Seen It, in EMMET JOHN HUGHES, THE LIVING PRESIDENCY 336 
(1973) (noting “the distinction between international-political and international-economic 
affairs” and concluding that “Congress should have and exercise greater direction over 
international-economic affairs … despite the obvious difficulty in separating economic and 
political affairs”). 
123 Pub. L. 62-434, 37 Stat. 912, 913 (1913) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 262). 
124 Wriston, supra note 57, at 45 (stating that Congress could withhold an 
appropriation if it were needed for a particular conference, that the Senate would have to 
advise and consent to any treaty arising from this conference, and that for “informal 
engagements … there would be need, not infrequently, for legislation to carry into effect 
[the] contemplated action”). Notably, these constraints are less applicable under the 
modern structure of international engagement. 
125 Wriston, supra note 57, at 40, 44.   
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Yet of the four lost limits on diplomacy identified here, this one is the most 
understandably lost. In the context of what issues can be fit subjects for 
Article II treaties, historical practice has recognized that subject matter 
limits are inappropriate. While a treaty cannot “authorize what the 
constitution forbids … it is not perceived that there is any limit to the 
questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly the 
subject of negotiation with a foreign country.”126 The challenge of drawing 
lines based on subject matter is substantial – harder in many ways than 




A third way to limit our constitutional concept of “diplomacy” would be 
to tie it to certain institutional actors within the executive branch. Under this 
approach, any exclusive presidential powers over diplomatic content, 
agents, and information could exercised by the President or agencies 
devoted primarily to the conduct of foreign affairs, but Congress would 
retain control over other agencies. In other words, the President’s exclusive 
powers over diplomacy could be tied to their exercise by diplomats. 
In 1789, when Congress established the initial Cabinet offices, it used 
quite different language in setting forth the duties of these offices. For the 
Treasury Department, Congress provided that “there shall be a Department 
of Treasury,” established the position of Secretary of the Treasury, and set 
forth a list of specific duties for that Secretary (such as “to prepare and 
report estimates of the public revenue and the public expenditures” and “to 
superintend the collection of revenue”).127 But for the State Department – 
initially called the Department of Foreign Affairs – Congress used quite 
different language, declining to give marching orders and instead 
emphasizing presidential control. Congress provided that “there shall be an 
Executive department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign 
Affairs,” that it should have a Secretary, and that this Secretary “shall 
perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined or 
intrusted to him by the President of the United States … relative to … 
matters respecting foreign affairs, as the President of the United States shall 
assign to the said department.”128 It added for good measure that “the said 
principal officer shall conduct the business of the said department in such 
manner as the President of the United States shall from time to time order or 
 
126 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). 
127 Act of Sept. 2, 1789, 1 Stat. 65, 66 (1789); see also id. at 77 (setting limits on who 
could hold the office, including that the person not be “the owner in whole or in part of any 
sea-vessel”). 
128 Act of July 27, 1789, 1 Stat. 28-29 (1789). 
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instruct.”129 
This approach to the State Department was befitting to the era of the 
corps diplomatique.  Thomas Jefferson’s claim in 1790 that the “transaction 
of business with foreign nations is Executive altogether”130 was with 
reference to transactions involving encounters between ambassadors and 
other public ministers who followed a set of formal practices established by 
international law and custom.  The era of domestic regulators talking to 
domestic regulators was mostly nascent – and to the extent it existed, we 
have no clear indications that Jefferson’s vision of executive power was 
meant to apply to it.  As noted earlier, in 1794, Congress specified that “the 
Postmaster General may make arrangements with the postmasters in any 
foreign country for the reciprocal receipt and delivery of letters and 
packets”131  This language – unobjected to as far as I can tell by the 
executive branch guardians of executive control over negotiation – seems to 
recognize the prospect of domestic agencies interacting through regulatory 
channels rather than the corps diplomatique in ways that were appropriate 
for congressional authorization. 
As U.S. domestic agencies beyond the State Department have come 
more and more to engage abroad, does their engagement partake of any 
exclusive presidential powers over diplomacy or is it instead subject to 
congressional control to the same extent as on domestic matters? Henry 
Wriston’s article from 1926 took it as a given that Congress could exercise 
more control over agencies (even including the State Department) than over 
the President. He rooted his objections to the 1913 congressional statute 
requiring specific authorization for attendance at international conferences 
in the fact that this law applied to the President rather than to a particular 
agency. He emphasized that Congress can indeed “giv[e] directions or 
powers, or limiting the authority of federal bureaus.”132 
While OLC now takes the position that the president’s diplomatic 
 
129 Id.  
130 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion Given on the Powers of the Senate Respecting 
Diplomatic Appointments of Apr. 24, 1790, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-16-02-0215 (arguing against 
legislative determinations of diplomatic grades); cf. Wriston, supra note 57, at 33 (noting 
how Congress nonetheless came to determine diplomatic grades over the nineteenth 
century). 
131 Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239. 
132 Wriston, supra note 57, at 39 (adding that “[s]uch an authorization is proper when 
directed to a bureau, but to require the President to get such authorization to engage in a 
discussion, for such is the work of a conference, is an entirely different matter”). OLC cites 
to the Wriston article as supporting presidential power over diplomacy, understood 
broadly, without ever mentioning this caveat. OLC Opinion of June 1, 2009, supra note 40, 
at 7. 
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powers apply to agencies as they engage abroad,133 this claim fits uneasily 
both with traditional congressional authority over agencies and with aspects 
of historical practice. Over the years, Congress has legislated in ways aimed 
at controlling the process by which agencies engage abroad. One notable 
example – the 1972 Case-Zablocki Act – requires that “an international 
agreement may not be signed or otherwise concluded on behalf of the 
United States without prior consultation with the Secretary of State.”134 
This statute bars agencies from making international commitments without 
the sign-off of the State Department, thus structuring the process of 
international engagement by the agencies of the executive branch. Kristina 
Daugirdas’s work demonstrates the long history of congressional control 
over Department of Treasury participation in organizations like the World 
Bank.135 And in at least one instance, Congress has mandated that a 
particular agency use notice-and-comment procedures with respect to 
international negotiations.136 
OLC has not only failed to grapple with these precedents, but also with 
the logic of its position with respect to independent agencies, which are 
subject to only light presidential control via appointments. These agencies 
can engage internationally without being particularly accountable to the 
President.137 In a 1984 case – one litigated before the executive branch 
became hyper-aggressive about asserting exclusive diplomatic powers – the 
Supreme Court seemed to assume that Congress could exercise control over 
commissioners of the Federal Communications Commission as they 
engaged in international exchanges.138  
 
133 E.g., DOJ Letter of Mar. 8, 2018, supra note 2. 
134 1 U.S.C. § 112b(c) (adding that “[s]uch consultation may encompass a class of 
agreements rather than a particular agreement”). As far as I know, the executive branch has 
not publicly challenged the constitutionality of this provision, which was passed at a time 
when the executive branch was considerably more accepting of Congress’s constitutional 
authority to intervene with respect to international engagement. The logic of recent 
executive branch reasoning would suggest, however, that OLC would likely view this 
provision as unconstitutional today, and it is unclear how extensively it is complied with in 
practice. 
135 See generally Daugirdas, supra note 6. 
136 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing this example).  
137 See generally Conti-Brown & Zaring, supra note 21 (discussing how the Federal 
Reserve engages abroad). This circle can maybe be squared by arguing that Congress can 
control these independent agencies abroad because the agencies are only representing 
themselves, and not the United States writ large. But that same logic could potentially be 
applied to executive branch agencies as well. 
138 FCC v. ITT World Communications, 466 U.S. 463 (1984) held as a matter of 
statutory interpretation that the disclosure requirements of the Sunshine Act did not apply 
to several commissioners of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) while they 
were attending a transatlantic conference of communications regulators. Nothing in the 
Court’s unanimous opinion suggested that Congress would have lacked the power to apply 
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It is easier to define “diplomacy” for constitutional purposes in terms of 
institutional structure than in terms of subject matter. Where it is difficult to 
distinguish between “political” and “technical” subject matters, it is 
relatively easy to distinguish between the Department of State and the 
Department of the Treasury. Under this institutional approach, Congress 
could keep nondiplomatic agencies from the negotiating table, set the terms 
under which they participate, or require them to share information with 
Congress to the same extent that Congress may exercise this control as a 
matter of domestic administrative law. (What this extent is as a matter of 
domestic law is a disputed issue, and one that I do not take up in this 
Article.139) Under this approach, Congress would be within its rights to ban 
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy from conducting 
bilateral negotiations with China to the same extent that it could exercise 
similar control on a matter of domestic administrative law – contrary to 
OLC’s view that such a ban is unconstitutional.140 As Zachary Price has put 
it, “Congress should … hold broad authority to limit use of nondiplomatic 
governmental personnel for diplomatic purposes.”141 Congress might 
choose to be chary in imposing limits or restrictions on how domestic 
agencies interact abroad, given the added usefulness of flexibility in 
international engagement, and it might be appropriate to give heightened 
deference to agencies with respect to this engagement.142  But this does not 
mean that Congress’s traditional right of control over domestic-facing 
agencies must vanish when they look outward.   
 
 
the Sunshine Act to FCC commissioners abroad. See generally id.  
139 For the broader debate on the scope of congressional control over administrative 
agencies as distinct from unitary executive power of the president, see generally Peter L. 
Strauss, Overseer or The Decider: The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 696 (2007); cf. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 140 S.Ct. 
2183, 2235 n.9 (2020) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (slip op. at 17) (suggesting with respect to the 
removal power that the President’s prerogatives should be particularly strong with respect 
to “close military or diplomatic advisers”). 
140 OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2 (finding this restriction 
unconstitutional). The Office of Science and Technology Policy is an office established by 
Congress in 1976; its Director is charged with providing “advice on the scientific, 
engineering, and all technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest 
levels of Government.” Pub. L. 94-282, 90 Stat. 463 (1976). While these issues could 
include matters of “national security” and “foreign relations”, the Director’s statutory role 
is to advise the President rather than to serve as a diplomat. See id.   
141 Price, supra note 6, at 461-62. 
142 See Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 735, 742 (2014) (arguing that practical needs for increased flexibility 
support acknowledgement of more independent presidential powers, heightened 
delegations and deference, and a relaxation of some procedural requirements). 
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4. International Organizations 
 
Participation in international organizations is a major form of U.S. 
international engagement today – one that was unforeseen by the Framers. 
This engagement is typically derivative either of a treaty that received the 
Senate’s advice and consent or of an international agreement that received 
Congressional authorization. U.S. engagement in the United Nations is an 
example of the former; U.S. engagement in the World Health Organization 
is an example of the latter.143 
For the executive branch today, such engagement is part and parcel of 
the proclaimed exclusive executive powers over diplomacy. The executive 
branch asserts the power not only to determine what positions the United 
States speaks for within these international organizations, but also how the 
United States engages in acts with formal international legal significance, 
like the casting of votes. 
This overlooks past practice that treats U.S. engagement in international 
organizations as different from traditional bilateral diplomacy for purposes 
of constitutional law. At the time the United States joined the United 
Nations, there was a sense that this was a transformative commitment that 
would rework practice regarding the separation of foreign affairs powers.144 
Edward Corwin described the implementing legislation as setting forth a 
“controlling theory” that “American participation in the United Nations 
shall rest on the principle of departmental collaboration, and not on an 
exclusive presidential prerogative in the diplomatic field.”145 Indeed, as 
noted earlier, in 1947 Congress legislated that the United States should not 
 
143 See 91 CONG. REC. 8190 (1945) (containing the Senate’s advice and consent to the 
U.N. Charter); Joint Resolution of June 14, 1948, 62 Stat. 441 (containing congressional 
authorization for U.S. entry into the World Health Organization). 
144 This was true not just with respect to international engagement, but with respect to 
other foreign affairs powers as well. With respect to international agreements and uses of 
force, the executive branch gained independent powers from this post-World-War II 
moments – gains it has retained even as it seeks to walk back any concessions with respect 
to what it terms “diplomacy”. For an account of how the executive branch gained power to 
bypass the Article II treaty process, see generally Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is 
NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995) (describing the shift away from 
Article II treaties to ex post congressional executive agreements in the post-World-War II 
era). For an account of this era’s influence on the constitutional distribution of war powers, 
see Curtis A. Bradley & Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers as an Interactive 
Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change, 91 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 689, 733-36 (2016) (noting how presidents relied on the U.N. Charter in bolstering 
claims to their concurrent war powers). 
145 Corwin, supra note 17, at 221 (deeming this a “sound constitutional principle in 
that it can claim a great deal of support from the history of the conduct of American foreign 
relations, especially in the period prior to the war with Mexico” and also “the only 
practicable principles unless we wish to establish outright Presidential dictatorship”). 
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cast a veto in the Security Council if a particular issue came before it, with 
the full knowledge and acquiescence of the executive branch.146  
A few years later, a House committee made a point similar to Corwin’s 
in a report regarding U.S. funding for international organizations. The 
report stated: 
The field of negotiation involved in the determining of the 
course and scope of operations in international organizations in 
which this Nation participates is distinguishable from [other forms 
of international relations]. It should be kept in mind that United 
States participation in such organizations arises not from inherent 
Executive powers under the Constitution, but is in pursuance to laws 
enacted by the Congress. The Executive cannot bind the Nation in 
this field, because contributions to international organizations 
involve the power of the purse, and that power belongs to 
Congress.147 
 
In now asserting that U.S. participation in international organizations is 
a manifestation of the president’s exclusive powers over diplomacy, 
executive branch lawyers ignore the ways in which congressional 
authorization is woven into U.S. participation in international organizations. 
When the executive branch casts a vote in the World Bank to fund a loan to 
a particular country, it does so only because Congress has approved U.S. 
participation in the World Bank and funds U.S. contributions to it. When 
the executive branch votes in the U.N. Security Council in favor of the 
imposition of sanctions on a particular country, it does so because the 
Senate advised and consented to the U.N. Charter and because Congress has 
given the executive branch the pre-existing authority to impose these 
sanctions. It would be relatively easy to conclude that the price of these 
authorizations is acceptance of congressional mandates – especially given 
all the tools that the executive branch has for keeping such mandates to a 
minimum. Instead, the executive branch has embraced the vast enlargement 
of “diplomacy” that has come from including international organizations 
with its ambit, while rejecting any direct limits on presidential control over 
this diplomacy. 
 




146 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.   
147 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on Amendment of Certain Laws 
Providing for Membership and Participation by the U.S. in Certain International 
Organizations 6 (Jan. 1, 1949). 
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The executive branch presently takes an all-or-nothing approach to the 
allocation of the diplomatic powers – all for the President and nothing for 
Congress. Up to this point, this Article has critiqued the constitutional 
foundations of this approach (as it applies to power over content, agents, 
and information) and challenged how the executive branch defines 
diplomacy for constitutional purposes. In this Part, I turn from the past to 
the future and ask how constitutional control over international engagement 
could best be conceptualized and operationalized going forward.  
I begin by setting out three doctrinal options: the complete control now 
claimed by the executive branch; a converse framework in which Congress 
would have the ultimate say; and an intermediate approach which would 
narrow but not entirely abandon exclusive presidential powers with respect 
to international engagement. I argue in favor of the third option, though 
recognizing that it has its flaws and will leave much unsettled. I then 
discuss institutional pathways by which Congress might pursue this option 
and strengthen its constitutional hand. I close by considering some lessons 
that my study of the diplomatic powers holds for broader scholarship and 
practice regarding the separation of powers.  
 
A.  Doctrinal Options for the Distribution of Powers 
Broadly speaking, three doctrinal approaches are plausible for the 
distribution of power respecting how the United States engages 
internationally with counterparts. The first approach is the one championed 
by the executive branch, in which the President has exclusive control over 
diplomacy – and diplomacy is understood capaciously. The second 
approach is one in which Congress would have ultimate control across the 
board, making the President obligated to carry out any congressional 
mandates except perhaps those that would remove presidential power over 
representation. The third approach would draw fine-grained lines, 
recognizing some space for exclusive executive power but defining this 
space far more narrowly than OLC does at present.  
The first approach – the maximalist OLC approach – does have certain 
advantages. I have criticized it throughout this Article as based on shoddy 
constitutional reasoning: it overlooks the Framers’ assumption that the 
products of negotiations would need to receive Senate advice and consent; it 
misreads some historical precedents; it ignores other historical precedents; 
and it fails to grapple with the radically different landscape of foreign 
policy in the modern era. But this approach is relatively easy to administer 
and it will produce desirable policy results at times and perhaps on average. 
The President’s policy judgments may often be better than Congress’s in the 
first place.  Moreover, the President will have more flexibility to adjust to 
changing situations if not bound by statutory constraints.   
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Nonetheless, this approach should be a source of considerable concern, 
and not only for those who are wary of legal overclaiming. It should alarm 
those who believe, as a matter of principle, that the President should answer 
to Congress or, as a matter of experience, that the risks of a horrific 
President make it valuable for Congress to be able to impose constraints. 
This is particularly true as claims over exclusive diplomatic powers are 
being drawn upon to justify not just talk, but also actions with international 
legal significance. The Trump administration’s decision that it could 
withdraw the United States from the Open Skies treaty in a manner that 
conflicted with a congressional mandate is an example of the importance of 
the distribution of diplomatic powers in practice.148 
The second approach – ultimate control to Congress – also has much to 
recommend it. It has strong claims as an originalist matter (power over 
representation excepted),149 it is faithful to the broader constitutional 
presumption in favor of congressional control, and it sets up a clear, bright-
line rule. The President’s role in the legislative process gives the executive 
branch a tool for resisting the passage of undesirable legislation. And if we 
are moving, as we seem to be, to a practice whereby presidents energetically 
repudiate many major foreign policy decisions of their opposite-party 
predecessors, then a presidential obligation to obey congressional mandates 
regarding diplomacy could provide useful ballast.  
A regime of pure congressional control would nonetheless rest uneasily 
with considerable constitutional practice. The history of the diplomatic 
powers is marked not by unmitigated congressional control, but rather by a 
longstanding constitutional tussle between the political branches. This 
Article has emphasized the presence of practice favoring Congress, but 
there is no shortage of practice favoring the executive branch as well, and 
some of it dates well before the OLC echo chamber of the last thirty years. 
There are legitimate functional concerns about how micro-management by 
Congress might hinder U.S. foreign policy. To give one example:  should 
the executive branch need a special authorization from Congress to attend 
any international conference, as required by the 1913 statute that remains on 
the books?150 
Moreover, any conclusion that the President has no exclusive diplomatic 
powers other than representation will have to grapple with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Zivotofsky. Even if the Supreme Court got this decision 
wrong, it is unlikely to reverse itself in the near future. One could just treat 
Zivotofsky as about recognition and nothing more, and the Court certainly 
 
148 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text. 
150 22 U.S.C. § 262. 
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does emphasize the narrowness of its holding.151 But Zivotofsky also 
suggests that the President has at least some other exclusive diplomatic 
powers, although clearly indicating that these powers are less than those 
claimed by the executive branch.152 
The third approach – an intermediate path – would build upon the 
complexity described in this Article. Such an approach would give 
Congress more power than the executive branch considers Congress to 
have, but it would accept that the President does have certain exclusive 
powers related to diplomacy. It would treat Zivotofsky as established 
doctrine with respect to the recognition power, acknowledging that the 
outcome in Zivotofsky was defensible (though not foreordained) as a matter 
of constitutional reasoning and deeming the Court unlikely to revisit this 
issue. For the rest, it would draw on Zivotofsky’s reminder that “[i]n a world 
that is ever more compressed and interdependent, it is essential the 
congressional role in foreign affairs be understood and respected.”153  
What would such an intermediate path look like? There is no single 
obvious answer and, for whatever path is chosen, implementation will be 
harder than for either of the other two paths because it eschews their bright 
line rules of always letting one branch win.  
I think the most promising approach would narrow our constitutional 
concept of “diplomacy” for purposes of exclusive presidential power in two 
of the four ways identified earlier. First, we could limit our constitutional 
concept of “diplomacy” to the negotiating process, rather than also 
including within it the formation of policy objectives and outcomes like the 
casting of votes. Such a limit would give Congress the option of exerting 
control over inputs and outputs, while shielding the executive branch from 
the risk of too much micro-management along the way. This option of 
Congressional control would be available in all situations except where 
either the President is negotiating a treaty that will be sent to the Senate for 
advice and consent (in which case, the requirement of subsequent Senate 
review serves as a powerful check on presidential over-reaching) or where 
the President is negotiating over issues that lie within presidential exclusive 
power as a matter of substance (such as recognition or the exercise of 
whatever slice of authority is exclusively given to the commander-in-chief). 
Second, we could confine “diplomacy” for purposes of exclusive 
presidential powers to the President and agencies designed to focus 
primarily on foreign affairs, allowing Congress to control nondiplomatic 
agencies as they engage abroad similarly to how Congress can control them 
as a matter of domestic law.  While it is functionally useful for agencies to 
 
151 576 U.S. at 20. 
152 Id. at 20-21. 
153 Id. at 21. 
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have extra flexibility when they engage abroad – and potentially to partake 
in part of the President’s concurrent (as distinct from exclusive) authority 
over foreign affairs – both historical practice and structural constitutional 
principles support ultimate control being vested with Congress. 
As discussed earlier, both these limits have plausible pedigrees.154 And 
bringing these limits into our constitutional concept of “diplomacy” would 
sharply narrow the scope of exclusive presidential power over international 
engagement. They would do by defining diplomatic content, agents, and 
information considerably more narrowly than the executive branch does at 
present.  
With respect to content, under this approach Congress could assert the 
same level of control over nondiplomatic agencies engaging internationally 
as it does over these agencies in other settings. As to the President (and 
diplomatic agents acting under the President), Congress could exert overall 
control over policy objectives and over the end products of negotiations, 
while leaving the President with exclusive power over the bargaining 
process itself. This would be similar to the exclusive power the President 
may have as commander-in-chief to make tactical decisions on the 
battlefield. This approach would mean that Congress can identify “the 
policy of the United States” without objection (a phrase that has symbolic 
power even though it may not give rise to binding obligations), instruct the 
President to pursue certain substantive outcomes through negotiations, 
mandate how the United States votes in international organizations, and 
delay or block the executive branch from joining international agreements. 
The President would have exclusive discretion, within the bounds of good 
faith, to decide with whom to negotiate, how to time the negotiations, and 
what words or tactics to employ. Control over the bargaining process would 
leave the President with considerable practical authority to thwart most new 
developments that the President does not support, even apart from the 
power to veto the legislation setting out policy objectives in the first 
place.155 Yet it would also empower Congress to slow or block sharp 
 
154 See supra Part II.B. I propose using only these two limits, and not the other two 
potential limits identified earlier. Defining “diplomacy” narrowly in terms of subject matter 
has only light support as a limiting factor as a matter of constitutional history and, perhaps 
relatedly, seems more challenging to implement in practice than does defining “diplomacy” 
in terms of institutional actors. As for international organizations, the other two limiting 
factors proposed would operate in practice to give Congress increased control over U.S. 
decision-making within these organizations.   
155 Control over policy and end products would also suggest that Congress should be 
able to set spending restrictions on foreign aid, see Price, supra note 6, at 454-55 
(discussing this issue), place time limits or bans on the entry into force of executive 
agreements, and potentially place time limits or bans on unilateral presidential treaty 
withdrawals. Cf. Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-17 at § 2, 121 
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swings in U.S. foreign policy. 
Turning to agents, Congress could control how nondiplomatic agencies 
engage abroad to the same extent that it can control these agencies in 
domestic settings. For engagement to count as “diplomacy” for 
constitutional purposes – and thus to trigger exclusive presidential power – 
it would have to run through the President or agencies designed to focus 
primarily on foreign affairs.  In other words, the diplomatic powers would 
run to those who are most clearly the institutional heirs of the corps 
diplomatique.  And even with respect to those heirs, we might also 
acknowledge some increased congressional control. As a seven-justice 
majority of the Supreme Court observed in June 2020, the advice-and-
consent requirement in the Appointments Clause was designed to “provide 
an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President and a guard 
against the appointment of unfit characters.”156 Yet even as international 
engagement has become far more productive of end products that do not 
require approval from the Senate or Congress, the executive branch has 
claimed that the President has exclusive power to conduct it through 
whomever the President selects, whether confirmed or unconfirmed. Ryan 
Scoville signals support for a “revitalized Appointments Clause … as one 
useful mechanism by which to reign in the executive and restore the 
separation of powers.”157 The use of special envoys available to the 
President could be left in place except to the extent that Congress has 
mandated otherwise. Similarly, Congress could retain considerable ability 
to structure the offices even of diplomats, as it did through the U.N. 
Participation Act.158  
Control over information would follow a similar path. Where 
administrative agencies are negotiating about their exercises of delegated 
powers, Congress should be able to mandate oversight through statutory 
reporting requirements to the same extent that they can mandate oversight 
on domestic issues.159 For negotiations conducted by the President or 
 
Stat. 201 (2015) (providing that the President could not waive sanctions on Iran during a 
specified time period (thirty or sixty days, depending on the start date) after the finalized 
agreement had been provided to Congress).  On those limited matters where the issues 
under negotiation are ones over which the President has exclusive control – such as 
recognition or whatever exclusive powers come with the commander-in-chief role – the 
President would necessarily have exclusive control over the policy objectives and outputs 
of negotiation. 
156 Financial Oversight and Management Bd. For Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, 
140 S.Ct. 1649, 1657 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
157 Scoville, Ad Hoc Diplomats, supra note 6, at 1002. 
158 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
159 Under this reasoning, the Trump administration should not have been able to invoke 
a privilege over diplomatic information in withholding a memorandum written by the 
Secretary of Commerce regarding potential tariffs that a statute obligated it to disclose. 
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diplomatic proxies, the President could have a narrow privilege to withhold 
documents related to the negotiations if the President deemed the public 
interest to require it. This approach would track the reasonable balance that 
was struck in practice prior to the Trump administration,160 consistent with 
what the Supreme Court has called a “tradition of negotiation and 
compromise” with respect to congressional subpoenas in general.161 It 
should be applicable except in impeachment proceedings, where the House 
and the Senate should be entitled to whatever information they need to 
determine whether “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors” have been committed.162 
The proposed redistribution of the powers offered here would probably 
not radically reshape U.S. international engagement in practice. As this 
Article has shown, Congress often passes statutory provisions with 
 
OLC Opinion of Jan. 17, 2020, supra note 1, at 1-2, 11-14 (also offering several other 
reasons for withholding the memorandum); cf. Cause of Action Institute v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, __ F. Supp. 3d __ , 2021 WL 148386 (2021) (holding that this memorandum 
could not be disclosed pursuant to FOIA in light of presidential communicative privilege, 
notwithstanding the various statutes mandating that it be made public). It might of course 
be the case that such requirements could damage U.S. negotiating interests. But this seems 
like an interest that Congress itself can weigh in deciding whether to attach reporting 
requirements to statutory delegations – especially in light of Congress’s strong 
countervailing interests in oversight.  The Biden administration ultimately released this 
memorandum in the summer of 2021, although apparently without comment as to whether 
it had a legal obligation to do so.  See Doug Palmer, Commerce Releases Trump-era Report 
Justifying Auto Tariffs on National Security Grounds, POLITICO (July 7, 2021), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/07/commerce-trump-era-report-auto-tariffs-
498531. 
160 In the 1996 controversy related to Mexico’s debt crisis mentioned earlier, for 
example, the Clinton administration ended up disclosing numerous documents and only 
withholding ones that related specifically to the White House (as distinct from agencies), 
including “confidential communications between the President and foreign leaders.” OLC 
Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at 259 (also noting the withholding of White 
House documents “revealing White House deliberations” and CIA documents “that 
constituted daily briefings for the President or records of meetings at the National Security 
Council or with senior White House staff”).  
161 Trump v. Mazars USA LLP, 140 S.Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020). In the parallel national 
security context, Congress and the executive branch reached a statutory compromise 
whereby the President ordinarily reports covert actions in advance to key congressional 
committees or their leaders but can delay this reporting in exceptional situations. 50 U.S.C. 
§ 3093(c)(1)-(3). 
162 Recognition of this principle goes back to George Washington and the Jay Treaty. 
Jean Galbraith & Michel Paradis, George Washington’s Advisors Agreed: Impeachment 
Did Away with Executive Privilege, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 25, 2019), at 
https://www.justsecurity.org/66713/george-washingtons-advisors-agreed-impeachment-
did-away-with-executive-privilege/ (noting agreement among Washington’s advisors that 
the papers related to the Jay Treaty would need to be disclosed if the House of 
Representatives had been pursuing an impeachment proceeding). 
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mandates regarding international engagement – but as frequent as these 
provisions are, they still address only a fraction of what is done by the 
executive branch. Moreover, if the executive branch came to recognize 
these provisions as constitutionally valid, it might exert more political effort 
during the bill-drafting process to keep them from becoming law or to 
demand the inclusion of sunset clauses in order to preserve future 
flexibility. Filibuster reform, should it ever occur, would make it easier for 
the executive branch to seek removal of statutory obligations that it views 
as too constraining.  Finally, treating domestic-facing agencies as 
controllable by Congress in their international engagement to same extent 
that they are controllable by Congress in domestic engagement would still 
leave significant space for executive branch officials to push back against 
Congress.  These officials could do so through general constitutional 
argumentation with respect to agents (based on variants of the unitary 
executive theory) and with respect to information (based on claims of 
executive privilege).  The executive branch could also potentially shift 
certain negotiations from the hands of domestic-facing agencies to 
traditionally diplomatic ones to strengthen its constitutional hand, although 
such gamesmanship would be unlikely to be worth the bureaucratic hassle 
for many matters of negotiation. 
Yet although the total effect of the doctrinal shifts proposed here would 
likely be modest relative to the total mass of U.S. foreign policy, it would 
be significant in establishing available checks on presidential power. For 
unless we draw some lines – even partially unsatisfactory ones – through 
the morass of U.S. international engagements, presidents are likely over 
time to define “diplomacy” for purposes of exclusive presidential power in 
broader and broader terms. With respect to content, the approach proposed 
here would enable Congress to have ultimate control of certain actions 
(such as votes in international organizations). This ultimate control over 
actions is particularly important as the executive branch has is increasingly 
reading the President’s asserted exclusive constitutional powers over 
diplomacy to cover actions like votes or treaty withdrawals.  With respect to 
agents, the approach proposed here would enable Congress to increase 
executive branch accountability by channeling who does what, especially 
with respect to the activities of nondiplomats and the exercise of delegated 
powers. With respect to information, it would ensure Congress’s powers of 
oversight even against a president who rejected traditional norms of 
cooperation. In other words, the doctrinal shifts proposed here might not 
matter so much for an expertise-reliant and norms-abiding president, but 
they could prove powerful – perhaps crucial – if a different kind of person 
holds the office.  
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B.  Institutional Paths to More Congressional Control 
 
Congress’s power over international engagement is hobbled by the legal 
views of the executive branch. Ultimate control now lies with the executive 
branch, because of its legal positions and its ability to make good on these 
positions in practice. Members of Congress interested in changing this 
dynamic could pursue one or more of three institutional strategies. 
First, Congress and its members could emphasize countervailing views 
of the diplomatic powers. Congress has already established a strong position 
of non-acquiescence to the current positions of the executive branch. As 
described in this Article, it has passed many statutes in the past asserting 
control over aspects of the content, agents, and information underlying U.S. 
international engagement. It has continued to pass such statutes in recent 
years, notwithstanding an increasing barrage of disapproving letters from 
the Department of Justice and signing statements from the President. These 
actions demonstrate Congress’s institutional ability to resist executive 
branch claims to exclusive powers – even despite all of Congress’s 
collective action problems and the risks of a presidential veto. 
In addition to continuing this approach, members of Congress should 
also consider formalizing the legal reasoning that justifies these statutory 
positions. Congress has no equivalent to OLC, but its committees can hold 
hearings on the allocation of constitutional power or undertake framework 
studies. In January 2001, for example, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee commissioned a major study of treaties from the Congressional 
Research Service.163 This study has come to serve as a reference point for 
members of Congress and for the scholarly community. A similar study 
undertaken with respect to diplomacy and its constitutional meaning could 
draw on long-neglected sources that bolster congressional claims to control.  
Second, Congress and its members could raise the cost for the executive 
branch of its extreme legal positions on what it calls diplomacy. Members 
of Congress have soft powers available for use in this regard. Prospective 
OLC heads could be asked about these positions at their Senate 
confirmation hearings. Congressional committees could hold hearings on 
occasions where the executive branch squarely disregards a statutory 
mandate related to U.S. international engagement.  
The back-and-forth that can occur at the policy-formation stage between 
committees and executive branch actors – particularly agencies – already 
means that executive branch actors may be much more accommodating to 
congressional views in practice than OLC thinks they need to be as a matter 
 
163 See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (2001).  
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of law. But Congress could further strengthen the power of its statutory 
mandates by tying their non-adherence to meaningful consequences. 
Ordinarily, the executive branch treats these mandates as severable, 
allowing it to get the benefits of authorizations for appropriations while 
ignoring the limits tied to it. In a 1990 memorandum deeming 
unconstitutional a provision that certain legislative-branch-connected 
officials be included in a particular set of negotiations, for example, 
William Barr concluded that the provision was severable from the overall 
authorization for funding in the absence of “evidence that Congress would 
not have enacted the authorization absent the condition.”164 Congress could 
attach “anti-severability” provisions (also known as inseverability 
provisions) to mandates that it thinks the executive branch might resist – 
thus raising the stakes considerably for such resistance.165 Alternatively, 
Congress could increase the extent to which it ties rewards to obedience to 
congressional mandates, as it already does with respect to the negotiation of 
trade agreements that will need ex post congressional approval.166 
As a third set of institutional strategies, Congress or its members could 
threaten to involve the courts. This strategy has both the highest risks and 
rewards. The Zivotofsky case came to the Supreme Court because Congress 
wrote a statute that carved a pathway to litigation, giving U.S. citizens born 
in Jerusalem the statutory right to list “Israel” as their place of birth on their 
passports.167 When one such citizen was denied this right, he had standing 
to sue, and the Supreme Court held that the case did not present a political 
question.168 When the case returned to the Supreme Court on the merits, 
however, the Court issued a blow against congressional power, as it 
validated the executive branch claims of exclusive constitutional power 
over recognition.169 
To the extent to which Congress wishes to tee up challenges for the 
courts over control of U.S. international engagement with respect to 
content, agents, and information, it has some capacity to do so. The path to 
the courts runs most clear with respect to information. In the national 
 
164 OLC Opinion of Feb. 16, 1990, supra note 40, at 42. 
165 For discussion of inseverability clauses as general tactic and an analysis of their 
likely enforceability, see, e.g., Israel E. Friedman, Note, Inseverability Clauses in Statutes, 
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 903 (1997). 
166 See Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. 
L. 114-26, 129 Stat. 320 (2015) (providing the President with a pathway to a quick up-or-
down vote on the trade agreement conditional on certain involvement of members of 
Congress in the negotiating process and adherence to certain substantive objectives). 
167 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 7-9 (2015); Pub. L. 107-228 at § 214(d), 116 Stat. 
1350 (2002). 
168 Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 556 U.S. 189 (2012). 
169 576 U.S. at 32. 
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security context, the Trump administration failed to publish a statutorily 
mandated report on uses of military force, leading several national security 
experts and a nonprofit to sue for its disclosure.170 Similar lawsuits could be 
brought should the executive branch withhold information related to 
international engagement that it is statutorily mandated to make public. 
Members of Congress or a single House of Congress might similarly be 
able to sue over information withheld from Congress despite a statutory 
mandate to provide it or over information subpoenaed by a congressional 
committee but then withheld.  
With respect to control over content and agents, congressional mandates 
that are disregarded by the executive branch could give rise to lawsuits by 
injured private parties or – conditional on congressional standing – by 
members of Congress. As to content, while many issues might not be 
justiciable, actions with legal and practical significance like votes in the 
World Bank could have consequences for private actors that would generate 
standing to sue. As to agents, private actors harmed by international 
agreements negotiated by non-Senate-confirmed officials or by 
nondiplomats whom Congress had banned from the negotiations could also 
give rise to lawsuits, just as a hedge fund recently (if unsuccessfully) 
brought an Appointments Clause challenge to a congressionally established 
board with power over aspects of Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy.171 Similarly, 
interested actors would also likely be able to sue over any violations of 
notice-and-comment procedures that Congress has established or comes to 
establish for agencies regarding international negotiations. 
To the extent that members of Congress wish to involve the courts as a 
strategy, as distinct from writing statutes that happen to lead to standing and 
causes of action for private actors, there are various way to go about it. 
Zivotofsky involved a matter of international engagement where the 
executive branch had an unusually strong claim to exclusivity in light of the 
absence of past statutes mandating recognition decisions and considerable 
Supreme Court dicta about the executive exclusivity of the recognition 
power. It also involved an issue that was both classically diplomatic in 
nature (recognition) and as politically sensitive as it gets (the status of 
 
170 See Scott R. Anderson & Benjamin Wittes, We Filed Suit Over Trump’s Missing 
War Powers Report, LAWFARE BLOG (June 9, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/we-
filed-suit-over-trumps-missing-war-powers-report (embedding the complaint). The 
executive branch ultimately released the report, thus ending the litigation. Scott R. 
Anderson & Benjamin Wittes, Trump Administration Releases Overdue War Powers 
Report in Response to Lawsuit, LAWFARE BLOG (Oct. 20, 2020), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-administration-releases-overdue-war-powers-report-
response-lawsuit.   
171 Financial Oversight and Management Bd. For Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, 
140 S.Ct. 1649 (2020). 
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Jerusalem). An alternative approach would be to focus initially on the areas 
where Congress’s claims look the strongest as a matter of constitutional 
structure or historical practice. The activities of administrative agencies 
abroad is one such area, given the substantial arguments that these activities 
should not be thought of as “diplomacy” for constitutional purposes. 
The institutional path to more congressional control is not an easy one. 
In his Youngstown concurrence, Justice Jackson made the chilling 
observation that “[i]f not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim 
attributed to Napoleon that ‘the tools belong to the man who can use 
them.’”172 While the Trump administration was even more extreme than 
prior administrations in claiming broad exclusive diplomatic powers, its 
words and actions have rested on a foundation contributed to by all five 
administrations that immediately preceded it. If Congress continues its 
current approach, it will maintain some degree of non-acquiescence to these 
executive branch positions, but it will not have the ability to mandate their 
implementation in practice. Only stronger steps, such as the second and 
third strategies discussed here, will enable that to occur. 
Should Congress succeed in gaining back control over content, agents, 
and information in U.S. international engagement, then this will have 
further effects for practice and policy. Right now, the executive branch can 
ignore statutory mandates with which it disagrees and that it can classify as 
going to “diplomacy”. But if that changes, then we may see more executive 
pushback against congressional mandates during the lawmaking process. 
The executive branch is likely to be particularly resistant to long-term 
mandates that leave it without substantive flexibility. By contrast, 
provisions that allow for considerable executive discretion, impose 
procedural requirements (e.g., notice requirements) rather than substantive 
ones, or have sunset clauses are more likely to get enacted. These in turn are 
the kind of provisions that enhance dialogue between the branches. 
 
C.  Broader Implications for Constitutional Law 
 
Constitutional control over diplomacy is a neglected aspect of the 
broader separation of powers. The account given in this Article is therefore 
important not only for its treatment of this fascinating and understudied 
issue, but also for what it contributes to more general debates in 
constitutional theory and practice.  
One contribution of this Article relates to executive branch lawyering 
and its effects. Do executive branch lawyers do more to constrain 
presidential power or to enable it? Especially since the infamous torture 
 
172 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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memos in George W. Bush’s first term, OLC has come under substantial 
scholarly scrutiny.173 OLC has few full-throated proponents, but its partial 
defenders emphasize the importance of its internal norms, “including a 
strong norm of adhering to its own precedents even across 
administration.”174  
This examination of the diplomatic powers has several implications for 
the broader literature about OLC. First, it reinforces how one-sided OLC 
can be in its legal analysis: cherry-picking the constitutional inputs that 
support a position favorable to presidential power and then overreading 
these inputs. Second, it demonstrates how transparency can be a tool of 
power rather than constraint. The stream of OLC memoranda about 
diplomatic content, agents, and information have not generated outrage or 
meaningful pushback over the years – perhaps because it is hard to mobilize 
public attention over a question like whether the head of the White House 
Office of Science and Technology Policy can or cannot collaborate with 
Chinese counterparts. This build-up of low-stakes precedents can provide 
valuable legitimacy for major moves down the road.175 Third, this 
examination of the diplomatic powers shows how OLC’s norm of 
adherence to precedent can itself be a source of concern. OLC now justifies 
 
173 For a sampling of the extensive literature, see Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents 
Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805 (2017) (arguing that “executive branch legalism has never been 
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Deference in the Office of Legal Counsel, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 757 (2018) (finding in an 
empirical review that OLC is “deeply deferential to the President and to presidential action, 
while remaining relatively impartial toward the agencies”); Sudha Setty, No More Secret 
Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists 
Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579 (2009) (arguing for increased disclosure of OLC opinions); 
Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688 (2011) (pointing 
to institutional factors that promote self-restraint within OLC); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE 
DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010) (arguing for the need of an 
independent quasi-judicial body within the executive branch). For earlier scholarship on 
OLC, one interesting resource is a symposium by the Cardozo Law Review on Executive 
Branch Interpretation of the Law. See 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 21 (1993) (introducing 
numerous essays, several of which focus on OLC). 
174 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, 
and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1133 (2013). 
175 On another important issue of foreign relations law – whether the President has the 
power to unilaterally withdraw the United States from treaties entered into with the advice 
and consent of the Senate – Curtis Bradley shows how low-stakes precedents became 
crucial ammunition in favor of presidential power during President Carter’s high-stakes 
decision to withdraw the United States from its mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. See 
Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 DUKE L.J. 773, 775 (2014) 
(observing that “[p]ractice then builds up around low-stakes examples” until “a more 
controversial example arises and the President pushes forward successfully, thereby 
consolidating the changed understanding”). 
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its positions on the diplomatic powers mostly by citations to prior OLC 
opinions. Heavy reliance on its own precedents makes it more difficult for 
OLC to change course and acknowledge that sweeping claims of exclusive 
presidential powers stand on shallow ground.  
Another contribution made by this Article relates to historical practice. 
This source of constitutional meaning is typically thought to favor the 
President in separation-of-powers disputes. The President has the incentive 
and the ability to exercise power, while the challenge of collective action 
make Congress more likely to acquiesce than to resist (as does the fact that 
many members will be loyal to the President under the party system).176 
The recognition power addressed in Zivotofsky is an example: in finding 
presidential power over recognition to be exclusive, the Court emphasized 
that historical practice “strong[ly] supported” this conclusion and that the 
“weight of historical evidence indicate[d]” congressional acquiescence.177 
Yet for the other powers relating to international engagement, it is 
notable how much historical practice exists that supports Congress. Why is 
this the case? For the diplomatic powers, it is the executive branch claiming 
exclusive power – unlike the power to initiate uses of force abroad, where 
the question is whether Congress has exclusive power. This makes 
Congress’s task easier. Because it is the executive branch claiming 
exclusive powers over diplomacy (defined broadly), any congressional 
statute that sets forth mandates can be deemed practice that counts against 
these proclaimed exclusive powers. A law stating “the policy of the United 
States” or mandating the executive branch to supply information to 
Congress is highly probative that Congress thinks it has the power to 
establish foreign policy or require the disclosure of information. In contrast, 
for the power to initiate uses of force abroad, Congress does not get much 
mileage as a matter of historical practice out of statutes authorizing the use 
of military force.  
In other words, one lesson from this Article is that historical practice 
tends to support findings of concurrent rather than exclusive powers. It is 
relatively easy for a branch to express its view that it has a concurrent 
power through practice – all it has to do is to exercise this power. By 
contrast, it is harder for a branch to express its view that it has an exclusive 
power through practice – it must not only exercise this power but also resist 
exercises of this power by the other branch. Where Congress is claiming a 
concurrent rather than exclusive power, as in the present context, it benefits 
 
176 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 84, at 438-47; see also Shalev Roisman, 
Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 668, 684-97 (2016) (noting the 
relevance of other factors to acquiescence). 
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from this trend even as it suffers from the separate ways in which historical 
practice tends to favor the President as the more energetic branch.  
One final contribution of this Article is to highlight the interface 
between administrative law and foreign relations law. We are far from the 
days in which there was a firm line between foreign affairs and domestic 
ones, if indeed those days ever fully existed. Yet the executive branch 
favors keeping all its proclaimed exclusive prerogatives even as once-
domestic issues spread into foreign spaces. Shirin Sinnar has written about 
“rule of law tropes” – ways in which the executive branch uses 
“recognizable term[s] from constitutional or international law” to legitimate 
its actions in contexts very different from the ones in which these terms are 
ordinarily used.178 The executive branch’s sweeping use of “diplomacy” can 
similarly be said to be a trope that papers over the vast differences between 
international negotiation at the time of the Framing and international 
engagement today. As domestic agencies move into foreign affairs – and as 
foreign affairs becomes more involved in the regulation of individual 
conduct – we need doctrine that takes these shifts into account. Some 
scholarship engages with these issues, but there is a long way to go.179  
 
IV. CONCLUSION: “THE ILL-FAVOURED NAME OF DIPLOMACY” 
 
Our constitutional system suffers from “the ill-favoured name of 
diplomacy.”180 As this Article has shown, the executive branch has 
transformed what was at best a narrow set of presidential prerogatives with 
respect to the conduct of treaty negotiations into sweeping constitutional 
justifications for exclusive control over “diplomacy” – understood very 
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broadly. It has done so by overreading sources from the Founding era, 
disregarding structural reasoning that favors congressional control, and 
ignoring extensive historical practice in tension with its positions.  
It is time for a better structural allocation of power. The executive 
branch should not have constitutional carte blanche to write off Congress 
when it identifies policy objectives or oversees U.S. agencies as they 
engage in overseas negotiations – or seeks the information it needs to 
decide whether the President has committed an impeachable offense. Future 
administrations will need to decide whether they wish to make indefensibly 
broad claims of exclusive executive power or instead pivot towards a more 
nuanced stance. If the executive branch does not cede ground of its own 
accord, then Congress has tools at its disposal to bolster its constitutional 
authority over international engagement.  
 
